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المراجع	IOR/R/15/1/478
العنوان	"ملف (V (D 8 53/7 شؤون الكويت والقبائل العربية"
التاريخ/ التواريخ	٢٢ سبتمبر ١٩٠٥-٢٠ يناير ١٩٠٧ (ميلادي)
لغة الكتابة	الإنجليزية و العربية في اللاتينية بالأحرف والعربية
الحجم والشكل	مجلد واحد (٢٦٤ ورقة)
المؤسسة المالكة	المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهند
حق النشر	<u>الملكية العامة</u>

### حول هذا السجل

يشتمل هذا الملف على مراسلات بين المسؤولين البريطانيين بخصوص الشؤون السياسية بالكويت والمناطق المجاورة لها. وتركز المراسلات على تطورات النزاع بين الشيخ عبد العزيز بن عبد الرحمن بن فيصل آل سعود وحاكم إمارة جبل شمر ورئيس الأسرة الحاكمة لقبيلة شمر (آل رشيد) عبد العزيز بن متعب، كما تتضمن تقريراً يصف مقتل الشيخ عبد العزيز على يد قوات ابن سعود (الورقة ١٣٥).

تتناول المراسلات كذلك العلاقات بين الشيخ مبارك الصباح (حاكم الكويت) والإمبراطورية العثمانية، ويحتوي الملف على نسخ من المراسلات بين الشيخ مبارك والمسؤولين البريطانيين حول هذا الموضوع. وتتضمن الورقة ١١٦ رسالة من الشيخ مبارك إلى اللورد جورج ناثنيل كورزون يعبر عن تعازيه لوفاة زوجة كورزون (ماري فيكتوريا كورزون).


ويضم الملف في الصفحات ١٢-١٧ برقية أرسلها حاكم قطر الشيخ جاسم بن محمد آل ثاني بالنيابة عن ابن سعود إلى السلطان عبد الحميد الثاني. كما يحتوي الملف على نسخ من البرقية مكتوبة بحروف

عربية و نسخة إنجليزية مع النسخة العربية الأصلية. كما يحتوي الملف أيضاً على تقرير كتبه  
سنيوارت جورج نوّكس الوكيل السياسي البريطاني في الكويت بعد رحلته إلى حفر في يناير ١٩٠٦  
(الأوراق ٢٣-٤٥) وتقرير آخر كتبه نوّكس بعد رحلته لمنطقة جنوب الكويت في مارس ١٩٠٦.





"ملف (V (D 8 53/7 شؤون الكويت والقبائل العربية" [أمامي] (٥٣١/١)







"ملف (D 8 53/7 V) شؤون الكويت والقبائل العربية" [خلفي] (٥٣١/٢)





"ملف (D 8 53/7 V) شؤون الكويت والقبائل العربية" [صلب] (٥٣١/٣)





"ملف V (D 8 53/7) شؤون الكويت والقبائل العربية" [حافة] (٥٣١/٤)









"ملف (D 8 53/7 V) شؤون الكويت والقبائل العربية" [رأس] (٥٣١/٥)








"ملف V (D 8 53/7) شؤون الكويت والقبائل العربية" [ذيل] (٥٣١/٦)
















"ملف V (D 8 53/7) شؤون الكويت والقبائل العربية" [١٠/٥٣١]









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
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
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"ملف (D 8 53/7 V) شؤون الكويت والقبائل العربية" [٢ظ] (٥٣١/١٣)











"ملف (D 8 53/7 V) شؤون الكويت والقبائل العربية" [ظ3] (٥٣١/١٥)











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ARABIA.

[December 11.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 878.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 5, 1905.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 340 of the 15th May, inclosing a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad, reporting the departure of a small force of Turkish infantry and artillery to Nasariye on the Tigris to operate against Sadoun Pasha of the Muntefik, I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, reporting the return on the 22nd October of the Vali, Mouklis Pasha, from the Muntefik, where he had been directing a punitive expedition against Sadoun.

Although the Vali claims to have been successful in capturing some of his strongholds, and to have sequestered his lands, he appears to have failed to lay hands on this notorious Arab Chief, who made good his escape into the Syrian desert.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Consul Crow to Sir N. O'Connor.

(No. 73.)

Sir,

Bussorah, November 11, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Vali returned from Muntefik on the 22nd October. I called on his Excellency, and inquired the result of his Mission.

The Vali said that Sadoun's importance had been much exaggerated. He had been accused of acts which he never committed, and many mistakes had been made. On a previous occasion the Imperial pardon had been granted him, but he did not merit it. He was a troublesome man, and a source of unrest in the district, and the Vali had recommended that, unless he settled down, and abandoned his predatory habits, no clemency ought to be shown him. After a careful inquiry on the spot the Vali had come to the conclusion that Sadoun was a man of no standing or importance, who had taken advantage of his family name to collect a few followers and tyrannize over a few tribes in Muntefik, and exact tribute from them to which he was not entitled. Sadoun had now taken refuge from pursuit somewhere in the Syrian desert, and, in order to bring him to his senses, the Vali stated that he had stopped the allowance which he received from the Imperial Government, and sequestered certain of his lands, so that he could derive no benefit from them. The Vali hoped by this means to reduce him to submission, but he did not anticipate any satisfactory result, and thought Sadoun was likely to give trouble.


From other sources I hear that the Vali pursued Sadoun, and tried to catch him, but he escaped into the desert; that he sequestered a property called Sakharah, given by the Sultan to Sadoun, and established the El Bedur tribes there, and left a guard in the place; that he destroyed four strongholds belonging to Sadoun, and removed provisions from them; that he exiled about ten persons, lessees of Government lands, charged with mischief and corruption at Nasariye; and that he forced the Cadi of Nasariye to resign by the somewhat drastic method of placing him under guard in the sun until he agreed to tender his resignation.

After these acts the Vali left Nasariye, and returned to Bussorah.


I have, &c.


(Signed) F. E. CROW.


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ARABIA.

[December 18.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 902. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 11, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah relating to the condition of Turkish troops in Central Arabia and the political situation there.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Consul Crow to Sir N. O'Connor.

(No. 75. Confidential.)

Sir,

Bussorah, November 18, 1905.

FROM information collected here, I learn that of the troops who went to Ghassim last year many died of starvation and many deserted. Some forty fugitives reached Koweit three weeks ago in a pitiable plight. The Sheikh provided them with clothing and money, hired a dhow for them, and sent them on to Bussorah.

Two officers, Reshid Bey, a Major, and Husni Bey, a Lieutenant-Colonel, left the troops in Ghassim and arrived recently in Bussorah. The latter came by way of Koweit with about fifteen men. He is said to be on his way to Egypt.

Orders were sent from Bagdad some weeks ago to Sudgi Pasha, in command of the troops in Ghassim, to discharge about 180 time-expired men. On checking the list it was found that of the 180 men only 18 remained, and the rest had died.

It is stated that the soldiers in Ghassim have received no pay, and that half the provisions sent from Medina were looted by the Arabs on the way. The troops now in Ghassim are said to number about 750.

Husni Bey seems to have quarrelled with his commanding officer, Sudgi Pasha, and to have left his post without leave. His account of the condition of the troops in Central Arabia may be highly coloured, but as regards numbers his version seems to agree roughly with that given by the Sheikh Mubarak to the Political Agent at Koweit.

The Resident at Bushire has sent me a copy of a statement made by Sheikh Mubarak to Captain Knox, describing the political situation in the interior of Arabia in October 1905. The Sheikh's account is as follows:—

Bin Reshid is not strong, even in Hail. Hamood, his uncle, and brother of Mohamed-bin-Reshid, is in charge, and has lost four sons in the recent fighting. Their names are Maid, Salim, Mohamed, and Obeyd. He has three sons left. The eldest is Sultan, who is at enmity with the rest of the family and lives at Jof. He has recently been in correspondence with Sheikh Mubarak. The other two, Saoud and Feysul, are with their father Hamood in Hail. Abdul Aziz-bin-Metaab, the Chief of the Bin Reshid family, has not resided at Hail for the last six years, but is constantly wandering in the desert.


The state of the town of Hail is deplorable. The population consists of Bin Reshid's soldiers. The residents, having no means of livelihood, have dispersed to other towns, selling their property to provide money for their journey.

Abdur Rahman-bin-Feysul, the head of the Saoud family, is at Riad. The town and district are prosperous. There is no truth in the story of a rising at Sedeir against Bin Saoud's power.

There are no Turkish troops or Turkish Representatives in Riad. Abdul Aziz-bin-Saoud, the eldest son of Abdur Rahman, lies armed in Boregda. There are fifty Turkish soldiers in Boregda, and thirty in Aneyza, but no Turkish civil Representative. The main body of the Turkish troops is at Shebiyeh, five hours north-west of Boregda.

[2294 s—1]






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They number 600, with eight guns, but are being constantly withdrawn. They originally numbered 7,000. They are under the orders of a Ferik, Sadig Pasha. Ghassim is prosperous. No Turkish customs have been established, and caravans come and go between Koweit and Nejd unmolested.

Sheikh Mubarak states that the general situation in the interior is entirely satisfactory from his point of view and that of his friends of the Bin Saoud faction.

Captain Knox adds that none of Mubarak's assertions have been verified, and says that the description of the Turkish troops sounds improbable. From a source not usually favourable to Sheikh Mubarak, Captain Knox learns that Bin Saoud's people lately raided some tribes supposed to be well affected to Bin Reshid, and that the Sheikh of Koweit remonstrated with Bin Saoud on the subject, pointed out the impolicy of unprovoked aggression, and threatened to withdraw his favour if such lawless proceedings continued.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) F. E. CROW.



Confidential

Bahrain

9<sup>th</sup> February 1906


My dear Major


An emissary from Bin  
Saud called on me yesterday.

His name is Musaad bin Suwailim  
& he has come here via Bida.

He ostensibly goes to Bushire for  
medical treatment. He tells me  
that Bin Saud feels himself  
strong enough to turn the Turks  
out of Hara & Katif, & then







strong enough to free himself at  
present from the Turks, though my  
information was not perhaps very  
reliable, & that I was quite  
certain that while England &  
Turkey were at peace our Govt  
would not do anything to <sup>restrain</sup> ~~prevent~~  
~~these~~ Turks in their endeavours  
to recover their possessions, if  
Bin Saud succeeded in capturing  
them by surprise.


The old gentleman did not seem  
to like what I said, so I suppose




he will go over the same ground  
with you.

Is it not possible for our Govt  
to work the "Status Quo" agreement  
more strongly in favour of Hijid?

They <sup>Turks</sup> have never yet touched Hanta  
& Sabrin Is., & if they continue  
working south-wards, planting out-posts Is.,  
why shouldn't we threaten to work  
upwards from the south? Or why  
should not we annex some <sup>or all</sup> of the  
desert islands along this coast? I think  
that an armed post on Zakhumija Island,  
close to Ajair, which has a water supply  
& yet really belongs to no one, would  
embarrass the pirates enormously.









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owners of the Qair coast if to  
anyone, & yet it is quite certain  
that the Turks have never committed  
any act of effective possession  
over it. The last residents  
of the island were the Dowasia  
who lived there for a time  
after leaving Nejd & Hara, & before  
coming further east to Bahrein.







12

Recd. at

Main  
Minor.

INDO-EUROPEAN TELEGRAPH DEPARTMENT.

Daily No. 18/10/1890 Monthly No. 390

by from

Trans. at

Main  
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by

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To


His Imperial Majesty the Sultan  
Amir ulmouminin Constantinople

Ayid allah serire Sultanetch bel az vennes  
men heiso enne obudiyyeti ve sedki ve ekhlasi  
ve sedakati ve fheirati ve hemmiyyeti la yeduni  
an ahek annasike ledini ve dovleti ve sultani  
sewa sedefe Kabulun amlay Kad Sabak men  
hazel abdessadik alanz be adami farsibe  
Soukhl assaker ashshahaneyeh ata ibn soud  
ve ennal amr dune zalac ve Kad delayyeneh  
fasis nesiketi ve afhtashashe arbab elmekased  
ve alghraz allegin la Sestefidun nekden ve  
Jahan ve moukkan ella be ehvase hazchel  
Mushakal vel Kalakel ve Kad aarazto afkari  
ande hoduse Kulle haduseh ez <sup>naeclat</sup> recito anan  
Rauhi





"ملف V (D 8 53/7) شؤون الكويت والقبائل العربية" [١٢ ظ] (٥٣١/٣٣)





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INDO-EUROPEAN TELEGRAPH DEPARTMENT.

Recd. at \_\_\_\_\_

Main \_\_\_\_\_ 190  
Minor. \_\_\_\_\_


Daily No. \_\_\_\_\_ Monthly No. \_\_\_\_\_

by \_\_\_\_\_ from \_\_\_\_\_

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To \_\_\_\_\_

Yakhshala nekho qur ala memalik Dowlat  
al aliyeh ve allet melle ve anwayeh  
men hal hewades alligi hedese men al amir  
abdul Aziz bin Rashid lamma <sup>Intikaf el</sup> en tekallil  
amir muhammad ve kwallil amir men  
beadeh abdul aziz bin Rashid <sup>Khlat</sup> ahlek albad  
ve nehebat ammal ve Keltallil rijal ve ehak  
ehatfal ve ammal fessad allet belad ve  
jaret alashkeya elareb ala nehebatpobul  
vettorok alligi beha tewaf addoolik fellamma  
Sare Zalik Kamu Solahaemas lamima  
reot ma assahal muslimine men agger  
assatou men ibn issoud ledafeg qur anhum  
memma assabahum men gik ehak gekame








INDO-EUROPEAN TELEGRAPH DEPARTMENT.					
Reed. at Main Minor.	Daily No. _____				Monthly No. 190
by	from				
Trans. at Main Minor.	Glass.	No.	Words.	Original date and time tendered by sender.	OFFICIAL INSTRUCTIONS.
by					Via
To					

bin Saud meahum ve refiqat mofsedum  
 ve alashkayae ahlal fasad ve amarat belad  
 ve alabad men hussne sirateh ve fi be  
 Seiretekh ve MusiheteKh le <sup>mowlah? el</sup> malbnahel aagem  
 amir almouminin ve Khelifeteh Resule rebbel  
 alemin ve huve Kaemum be rassmel Khedme  
 ve febaeyyete le Dowlatekh ve mohami ala  
 Jamie fevarokaha ve giletekh tashkido behi  
 jemial beruyyeh fe ahabbohu jemial nas  
 Kaffeh ve bin saud Kad esitarham  
 nuraran ve hove Khademun motion le  
 amir almouminin la be Kharijen ve la  
 asi ve men heiso annehu nesmaa enne  
 bin Rasheed Dayem lam yezgal yelki



"ملف V (D 8 53/7) شؤون الكويت والقبائل العربية" [١٤ ظ] (٥٣١/٣٧)





INDO-CHINA TELEGRAPH DEPARTMENT. 190

Reed. at \_\_\_\_\_ Daily No. \_\_\_\_\_ Monthly No. \_\_\_\_\_

by \_\_\_\_\_ from \_\_\_\_\_

Trans. at \_\_\_\_\_ Class. No. Words. Original date and time tendered by sender. OFFICIAL INSTRUCTIONS.



Main \_\_\_\_\_ Minor. \_\_\_\_\_


by \_\_\_\_\_

To \_\_\_\_\_


Tashbihat ala ehlel alghaz ve yebzil lekum albisat  
 le ajal yotashabbekume bel Kizb ve al bohtan  
 Ve jemien nassel moolemin yosterhemun  
 le moulahum alaazem amir almusiminin an  
 la yosna Kalame arababek mohased ve  
 alaahraz aada eddowlele ve almellek ve  
 ehlel Kizb Kizb ve albohtan Kana enni asterhem  
 anla tefal mesikati haza fi zeverijel ahmal  
 ve alamer ve alferman le hezretah man  
 lehul amr ve sallelloho ala mohamed veahd  
 (Saidy name) Kana am mekam Kazi Kater ve reise askamiraka  
 ve kibayelleha al abdussadek Jassim ab Sami









المرجع: IOR/R/15/1/478 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة



"ملف V (D 8 53/7) شؤون الكويت والقبائل العربية" [١٦ ظ] (٥٣١/٤١)








Translation of a Telegram 16<sup>(17)</sup>  
 dispatched in Romanized Arabic  
 to H.M. The Sultan, Constantinople  
 from Bushwile by a representative  
 of Ibn Saood & Shaikh Jasim bin Thami  
 on Feb. 18. 1906.


To, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan,  
 Commander of the Faithful, may  
 God <sup>uphold</sup> ~~support~~ his Imperial throne with  
 glory and victory.

Whereas ~~my~~ <sup>my</sup> devotion, honesty,  
 sincerity, ~~straightforwardness~~ <sup>frankness</sup> and ~~real~~ <sup>genuine</sup> ~~glamour~~ <sup>glamour</sup>  
 do not ~~allow me to~~ <sup>allow me to</sup> ~~make~~ <sup>make</sup> ~~discontinue~~ <sup>discontinue</sup> ~~my~~ <sup>my</sup> ~~sultan~~ <sup>sultan</sup>  
 to my religion, Government and ~~my~~ <sup>my</sup> ~~interest~~ <sup>interest</sup>  
 whether they are accepted or not, a petition was  
 previously made by this ~~loyal~~ <sup>loyal</sup> slave suggesting  
 the undesirability of ~~employing~~ <sup>employing</sup> ~~a body of~~ <sup>a body of</sup> ~~imperial troops~~ <sup>imperial troops</sup>  
 against ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~Ibn Saood~~ <sup>Ibn Saood</sup> - a course for which  
 there was no necessity. ~~The matter did not require this~~ <sup>in my apparent</sup>  
 (step) ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> The effect of my advice, ~~and the~~ <sup>and the</sup>  
 as also ~~are the~~ <sup>are the</sup> disturbances caused by interested persons, who  
 are ~~unable to derive profit~~ <sup>are unable to derive profit</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> ~~cash, money, or opportunity,~~ <sup>cash, money, or opportunity,</sup>  
 except ~~when~~ <sup>by</sup> creating ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> difficulties and trouble,  
 as manifest ~~as~~ <sup>as</sup> like these ~~undisputed~~ <sup>undisputed</sup>.  
 Indeed I stated my opinion ~~on~~ <sup>on</sup> the  
 occurrence of ~~each~~ <sup>each</sup> incident, which I ~~considered~~ <sup>considered</sup>  
 to be harmful to the Turkish Empire and  
 to ~~the~~ <sup>its</sup> ~~faith~~ <sup>faith</sup> and subjects, ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~which~~ <sup>which</sup> ~~emanated~~ <sup>emanated</sup>  
 from



17  
<sup>Abdul</sup>  
 caused by the proceedings taken by Amir Aziz  
 bin Rashid from the time of the death of  
<sup>when</sup> Amir Mohamed <sup>died</sup> <sup>and</sup> the affairs of State passed  
 into the hands of <sup>the said</sup> Abdul Aziz bin Rashid  
 He massacred the faithful  
 plundered <sup>their</sup> property; <sup>he put</sup> <sup>to death</sup> <sup>murdered</sup> men, killed  
 children; and disturbance <sup>became general</sup> prevailed in the  
 country, and the <sup>lawless</sup> Arabs were encouraged  
 to infest the roads and <sup>high</sup> <sup>along which</sup> <sup>the</sup> dependants  
 of the Government lived <sup>in</sup> <sup>distress</sup>.  
<sup>When this</sup> <sup>came</sup> <sup>to</sup> <sup>his</sup> <sup>pass</sup>  
<sup>He</sup> <sup>such</sup> <sup>was</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>case</sup> <sup>of</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>poor</sup> <sup>men</sup>,  
 seeing the <sup>harm</sup> <sup>losses</sup> <sup>which</sup> <sup>were</sup> <sup>being</sup> <sup>suffered</sup> <sup>by</sup> <sup>the</sup>  
 Muslims, came forward, and solicited  
 Ibn Saood to ward off the difficulties <sup>in</sup> <sup>which</sup>  
<sup>they</sup> <sup>were</sup> <sup>placed</sup> <sup>on</sup> <sup>account</sup> <sup>of</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>circumstances</sup>  
<sup>circumstances</sup>. Ibn Saood <sup>then</sup> <sup>joined</sup> <sup>them</sup>,  
 He expelled the evil doers and wicked persons,  
 and secured tranquility to the Country and  
 people by his excellent behaviour and <sup>good</sup> <sup>high</sup>  
 character and by his righteous services to the  
 great Lord, the Commander of the faithful,  
 and the successor of the Prophet of God of  
 the two worlds. <sup>He</sup> <sup>is</sup> <sup>ready</sup> <sup>to</sup> <sup>render</sup> <sup>services</sup>,  
 and <sup>submit</sup> <sup>himself</sup> <sup>to</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>Government</sup>, and  
 protects all the <sup>roads</sup>, and all the people  
 testify to this. He is <sup>loved</sup> <sup>by</sup> <sup>all</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>people</sup>  
<sup>indeed</sup> in general. Ibn Saood has <sup>repeatedly</sup>  
 invoked favour saying that he is an obedient







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
servant of the Commander of the Faithful  
 and that he is neither an <sup>Schismatic</sup> ~~schismatic~~ <sup>nor a rebel</sup> ~~schismatic~~  
<sup>On the other hand</sup> ~~disobedient~~ <sup>person</sup> ~~nor a rebel~~ <sup>As I hear that Bin</sup>  
<sup>ceases not to supply material for his office</sup> ~~Rashid always causing~~ <sup>to</sup> interested persons and giving them bribes with  
 a view to their making misrepresentations  
 and accusations; <sup>Therefore</sup> all the Mussalmans beseech  
 the Great Lord and the Commander of the  
 Faithful not to listen to the statements of  
<sup>such</sup> ~~the~~ interested persons who are the enemies of  
 the State and <sup>the faith</sup> ~~religion~~ and who are liars  
 and false accusers; <sup>and similarly</sup> ~~the same way as I~~  
<sup>pray for</sup> ~~trust~~ that this my <sup>Counsel</sup> ~~advice~~ (prayer) may not <sup>be</sup> ~~rejected~~  
<sup>be taken with indifference</sup> ~~rejected~~ set aside; and the order and  
 Command rest with His Majesty; and <sup>may</sup> ~~Peace~~  
 rest upon Mohammed and his family.

(From) Kaim mukhaml, Kazi  
 of Kati and chief of its clans  
 and tribes Jasim al Thani

K







[Confidential.]

No. 64, dated Bushire, the 23rd February (received 6th March) 1906.

From—MAJOR P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,  
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

With reference to the correspondence ending with Foreign Department endorsement No. 429-E. B., dated 30th January 1906, I have the honour to furnish the following information bearing on the situation in Nejd.

2. On the 12th instant, I received a communication from the Political Agent, Bahrein, to the effect that an emissary of Ibn Saood named Musaad bin Suweilim had arrived at Bahrein *via* El Bida and had called at the Agency. He informed Captain Prideaux that Ibn Saood felt himself strong enough to turn the Turks out of Hassa and Katif and then wished to enter into treaty relations with us, allowing us if we desired to keep a Political Officer in Hassa or Katif in return for our protecting him from a sea attack from the Turks.

Captain Prideaux expressed his personal doubts as to whether Ibn Saood was strong enough to free himself from the Turks, and otherwise refrained from giving any encouragement to Musaad's suggestions, and the old gentleman left the Agency in a somewhat disappointed mood saying that he intended to proceed to Bushire by the next mail for medical treatment.

3. On the same date three Nejd Arabes arrived in Bushire and I had their movements watched as reported in item No. 180 of this Office Political Diary for the week ending 18th February 1906. They proved to be Musaad bin Suweilim and two companions. They stayed with Najaf bin Ghalib, the Koweiti merchant living in Bushire, and on the 18th instant they sent a long and expensive telegram to His Majesty the Sultan in Romanized Arabic of which I attach a translation. It will be seen that it actually purports to come from Sheikh Jasim bin Thani but was evidently sent on behalf of, and in communication with, Ibn Saood.

With reference to the first-named veteran, it is interesting to note that at the end of the telegram, as transliterated for delivery to the telegraph office, he describes himself;

"Kayem Mekam Kaze Katr ve reiese ashayeraha ve kebayelleha al abduadek Jassim al Sani."

I am doubtful whether this is intended to mean;

"Kaim Mukam of the Kaza of Katr and Chief of its clans and tribes, the faithful slave Jassim al Thani" or;

"Kaim Mukam and Kazi of Katr and Chief of its clans and tribes, the faithful slave Jassim al Thani"

Whichever it be, Sheikh Jassim poses as the humble slave of His Majesty the Sultan, whereas in a letter to the Political Agent, Bahrein, which must have been written about the same time as the above telegram, he rather went out of his way to mention the fact that he considered himself subject to Sheikh Esa of Bahrein.


4. The position seems to be that Ibn Saood is exasperated by the neglect of the Turks to suppress Ibn Rashid, and that he (Ibn Saood) and Sheikh Jassim, whose sympathies are with him, are sitting on the hedge at present and apparently sent this representative, Musaad bin Suweilim, with instructions to sound the British representative in the first place, and, if he received no encouragement from the latter, to proceed to Bushire and send the above telegram to the Sultan.

My informant tells me that the Arabs expected to receive their reply *via* Basrah and it was therefore no use their remaining here longer. They left again for Bahrein on the 21st instant, and I may mention that they did not visit the Residency during their stay in Bushire.

5. I am forwarding a copy of this communication to His Majesty's Consul Basrah, for information.

5150 F. D.





Translation of a telegram despatched in Romanized Arabic to His Majesty the Sultan, Constantinople, from Bushire by a representative of Ibn Saood and Sheikh Jassim bin Thani, on the 18th February 1906.

To

His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, Commander of the Faithful, May God uphold his Imperial Throne with Glory and Victory.

Whereas my devotion, honesty, sincerity, friendliness, zeal and sense of honour do not allow me to discontinue tendering advice to my religion, my Government and my Sultan, whether they are accepted or not, a petition was previously made by this loyal slave suggesting the undesirability of employing a body of Imperial troops against Ibn Saood—a course for which there was no necessity.

The effect of my advices is now apparent as also are the disturbances caused by interested persons who are unable to derive profit in cash, money, or opportunity except by creating difficulties and troubles like these under reference.

Indeed I stated my opinion on the occurrence of each incident which I considered harmful to the Turkish Empire and to its faith and its subjects, and which emanated from Amir Abdul Aziz bin Rashid from the time when Amir Mohamed died and the affairs of the State passed into the hands of the said Abdul Aziz bin Rashid.


He massacred the faithful and plundered their property; he put men to death and killed children; and disturbance became general in the country, and the lawless Arabs were encouraged to infest the roads and highways along which the dependents of the Government dwelt.


When things came to this pass pious men seeing the harm suffered by Muslims, came forward and solicited Ibn Saood to ward off difficulties which befell them in their sorry plight. Accordingly Ibn Saood arose and joined them. He expelled the evil-doers and wicked persons and secured tranquillity to the country and people by his excellent behaviour and high character and by his righteous services to the Great Lord, the Commander of the faithful, and the successor of the Prophet of God of the two worlds. He still remains ready to render service, and submissive to Government, and protects all the roads, and all the people testify to this. He is beloved by everybody in general. Ibn Saood has indeed repeatedly, invoked favour saying that he is an obedient servant of the Commander of the faithful and that he is neither schismatic nor a rebel. On the other hand, according to what I hear, Ibn Rashid ceases not to supply material for suspicion to interested persons and to give them bribes with a view to their making misrepresentations and accusations; and therefore all the Muslims beseech the Great Lord and Commander of the Faithful not to listen to the statements of such interested persons who are the enemies of the State and of the faith, and who are liars and false accusers. Similarly I pray that this my counsel may not be treated with indifference; and the order and command rest with His Majesty; and may Peace rest upon Mahomed and his family.


(from) Kaim Mukam 1 } Kâzi of the Kaza { of Katr and Chief of its  
" " 2 } clans and tribes,

JASIM AL THANI.









Sir,

I have the honour to submit herewith a report on the tour undertaken by me during the month of January. The first half of the tour was to Busrah and passed without any incident worthy of mention except that I received a warm welcome & passed a pleasant day's hawking with the Bin Mishri household from Zubair who were encamped at Gishamija wells.

2. As, in consequence of the strongly expressed wishes of Sheikh Mobarak, I did not pass through either Sefwan, Unkaer or Zubair, I may mention that I saw no signs of Turkish rule until I reached an encampment of Turkish troops just outside the town of Busrah.





3. The officer in command of this detachment treated me with great civility & told off a corporal & file to show me the way to the British consulate, an attention all the more welcome as I had arrived at his quarters at 9 p.m. & had still some three miles to go. An accident had prevented my being met, as expected, at El Jawa 9 miles from Bussorah.

3. I fear that the results of the tour to El Hafar will appear somewhat meagre but it is at least something to have shewn that a British officer can, under the auspices of the Sheikh of Koweit, travel leisurely & without the least attempt at concealment with an insignificant escort over 150 miles of this wild country without being in any way molested en route.

4. On my remarking this to Sheikh Moobarak, he observed that it would have been all the same had I proceeded to El Kasim and, as far as I can venture to judge from the hejdis I have met, I believe that, with




suitable Bedouin rafiqs we could<sup>27</sup>  
safely venture across the Dalma &  
be sure of a hospitable welcome on the  
other side


I have the honor to be  
Sir


Your most obedient servant

Thomas Captain  
Political Agent, Koweit.












29 (29)  
traversed. The only instrument carried was a good pocket compass and distances were calculated by carefully timing the pace of the baggage camels. Their pace was estimated at three miles an hour and is fairly correct for the journey to Hafar along a well marked road, not easy to miss. On the return route, ~~however~~ however, besides the fatigue of constant travel on a scant water supply, the baggage was constantly deviating from the true course and the return distances, noted in the tour diary, have been reduced to fit into the map.


All that can be regarded as certain is that Rigai is south of Jahra and Koweit that the general course of the Batin from Rigai to Hafar is S.W. and that Hafar is well south of Grayn hill. The positions of Koweit, Jahra fort, Wara and Burgan were fixed by the survey work of January 1905.


Bedouin guides.

The journey to Hafar presented no great difficulty, as from Jahra to Saida ridge, the country is well known and the landmarks conspicuous and sufficient. At no great distance from Saida is the Khabra ul Faragh and thence the road to El Kasim is on the whole well marked as far as Rigai while from Rigai to Hafar, an over cautious traveller has nothing to do but follow the sha'ib, as it is called, of the Batin and he could not miss his way which would not be greatly prolonged. The man, who has once seen his road from Jahra to El Hafar should















31 (26)


between N E and E, maintaining that in this he was following the practice of Awwalin/ or ancients in similar predicaments. It will be inferred from the above that the probable error in the map is that Hafar is shown too far north.

Ambykhan himself made frequent use of the compass and studied it long and deeply whenever placed on the ground.

The following extracts from the Political Agent's private diary may prove of interest as giving some indication of the country travelled over and may be useful to future travellers.

Thursday 18th January. The Nejd camelmen, who have had the opportunity of discussing the question of the march to El Hafar for the last five days, have to-day come to the conclusion that their camels cannot do the distance, though one of the leaders seems to think that they might get through if additional hire was paid to them. Their promise was to accompany me wherever I pleased at a fixed daily rate per camel Krans 6 and one real per day for the food of the camelmen. Moolia Abdulla and Erbid have spent the whole day arguing the case and have at last come to me in the evening to say that they have exhausted all reasonable means of expostulation and I have said that we






will take them before Sheikh Mubarak  
the morning.


Friday 19th January. The camelmen  
came before the Sheikh who argued the  
question with them patiently but at  
last informed me that he would get  
camels for me in Jahra and that, of  
course, the Nejdīs would lose their  
hire for the period of four days halt  
at Jahra. As the day wore on, the  
younger members of the party came to  
say that they wished to go but that  
their elders were foolish people; and,  
when other camels were actually pro-  
duced, the Nejdīs gave way altogether  
and expressed their readiness to go  
on, dying camels and all. As Moolla  
Abdulla and the Bedouins mistrusted  
the impressed camels of Jahra and on  
the principle of "<sup>3</sup>/<sub>4</sub> is best to bear  
the ills we have" I decided to retain  
their services.

Saturday 20th January. The "hamla"  
by which useful term borrowed from  
the Bedouins I shall in future style  
the baggage, camelmen and their ani-  
mals, started off at 7.20 a.m. and  
after a brief adieu to Sheikh Mubarak  
and his people who wished us a safe  
and quick journey, we started on the  
rakaib and at 7.55 a.m. overtook the  
hamla at the Jahra wells where they  
had only just finished filling the  
water skins.

Jahra wells are barely a mile from  
the fort. Our course lay S.W. and most








33 09  
of our march of the morning was marked by cloudy weather and occasional showers. At 8.35 a.m. we left Khabra ul Bal on our right. This basin collects a certain amount of water on its way to Jahra and in favourable seasons I am told a scanty crop of wheat or barley is raised here. At 8.55 a.m. we had the hill of Rahaya or the millstone on our left. Shortly after leaving this spot, we disturbed a wolf engaged on a dead camel and Amreykhan started off on a wild goose chase with his rifle. There were plenty of sand grouse all along today's route and in the batin. We shot <sup>varieties two</sup> four of them called "kidney" by the Be'ouins. These last are beautiful birds with a hoarse croaking call not unlike that of a crow.

The next name we met with was Umm Atweynich where there are one or two khabras and the remains of a mud hut on the left of the road. It is a basin formed by Farida, the solitary hill to our right at right angles to the Atrah or broken mounds at the extremity of the Umteybya range and by a semicircular ridge which we climbed. The hamia reached this spot at 10.45 a.m. 8 miles from Jahra.

After turning the corner of the Farida slope, we went S.W. with a little more W. in it towards Sadda. This word is apparently connected with the sudd of Mobarak's date gardens at Wao and would be called in









India the bund. There is a beautiful <sup>34</sup> landmark on our right front on the ridge of Saida, Khad-i-Saida. It is called Inheydayn or the two breasts. The only objection to the name is that there are three of them

Before reaching the sandstone ridge of As-Saida, I looked back over my <sup>left</sup> shoulder and saw the twin brother of Inheydayn behind me. Another excellent landmark, called 'MR'ooz the mother of heads

We surmounted the ridge of Saida by a path near a dry torrent fed from the plateau above. The hamla reached the same spot at 1.25 p.m. say between 16 and 17 miles from Jahra. We have been gradually rising the whole way but shall soon descend on the Shag. Saida appears to be about the level of Umteybya and runs nearly N. and S. Half a dozen Bedouin tents are packed out of the way of the wind to the right and left of the road and an old gentleman of the Umteyr comes up to where we are waiting for the hamla to tell us that they belong to his tribe and to hear the news.

We have begun to go W. by S.W. and leaving Khabra ul Parakh on our left, have reached the hamth which means that we have passed the Shag or dividing line between the hamth and Arafij. We are awaiting the hamla which come up at 4.30 p.m. having







marched  $8\frac{1}{2}$  hours and covered, I estimate 25 miles. Here we halt for the night.

Sunday 31st January. A heavy shower of rain at 6.30 a.m. made breakfast difficult and delayed the packing up but the hamla was off at 7.40 a.m. Our course is to be W. with a little S.W. in it. Dibdiba begins with the hamth and ends with the Batin but I have heard that it continues again beyond it. At 10 a.m. the hamla reached the road to El Kasim. It consists of half a dozen parallel camel tracks and the Bedouins say it continues the whole way. None the less it requires fairly careful watching for the camel grazing grows thick about here and it is by no means impossible to lose the track. At about 11 a.m. we, on the rakaib left Umm Amara to the South. This is not a good land mark merely an indistinct rise in the plain but I am told water collects there in heavy rain and that there are traces of old deep wells. The hamla arrived at our halting place at 4.30 p.m. They went better and quicker to-day but halted half an hour. The length of march I estimate at 25 miles.

Monday 33rd January. The hamla started at 7.40 a.m. Course still W. with a little S.W. in it. Most of to-day's march through poorer country than ever and with no landmarks, so that if one lost the road, one would be badly










off. We saw about 7½ gazelle to-day. ~~at~~  
At 12.30. The Bedouins assured me at break-  
fast that we were only an hour from  
the Batin but we left at 1 p.m. and  
at 3.30 p.m. we halted with Rigai 5  
miles further on. Some Mishaida told us  
disquieting news which turned out to  
be correct that we would not hope to  
fill a kirby at Rigai. The hamla did  
not reach until 4.30 p.m. but the pace  
was better and I estimate to-day's  
march as not much less than 30 miles.  
When we halted at the Khabra of Umm-  
ul-Hamir, I pushed on with Erbid and  
Amreykhan to find out what chances  
there were of water at Rigai. The ground  
from Umm-ul-Hamir to Rigai is curious-  
ly depressed, a sharp downward slope  
of a few feet to the east with a slow  
rise to the west, the scanty drainage  
running down towards Umm-ul-Hamir. This  
occurs 5 or 6 times and is the first  
true indication to the unpractised ob-  
server that you are near the Batin. When  
you reach the <sup>in</sup> ~~Rijai~~-i-Rigai, the slope  
is running down to El Batin. There is  
no question here about the depression  
of the Batin and I should judge it a-  
bout a couple of miles across at this  
point and the shaib 200 feet below the  
bank.

Rigai is on the S.E. bank. On the  
way down the slope and just to the  
right of the road-one.












38 (33)  
from Rigai but of which my Bedouins  
would only tell me that it lay on the  
S.E. bank of the Batin. They did not know  
its name.

The Batin winds a bit here and we  
moved along the S.E. slope crossing the  
A'athariyat a series of half a dozen  
torrents of much the same character  
as Rigai which sometimes hold water  
underground. In the course of the day's  
march we descended to the shaib of the  
Batin and were even for a short time  
on the lower edge of the N.W. slope.

The shaib consists of a dark colour-  
ed clay "but" showing signs of water  
but of an almost stagnant flow settling  
down deposit from the banks on right  
and left. There were no signs of scour.


In Baluchistan the stream would,  
I think, have been banded up and khoosh-  
kaba cultivation produced once in 5  
years or so, for the side torrents must  
bring down water sometimes and wells  
could undoubtedly be dug as has been  
done at El Hafar. If the expenses was  
incurred of digging a well between  
Rigai and Hafar for the purpose of  
improving the route between Busrah and  
El Kasia nothing but security from the  
Bedouins and their camels would be re-  
quired to produce a scanty dry weather  
crop. The shaib produces large patches  
of a low scrub sufficiently high to  
screen a gazelle or a bustard. It is  
nowhere more than half a mile broad.









My Bedouins produced to-day <sup>or</sup> 39<sup>th</sup> in-  
section two extraordinary looking  
plants called Furthooth a cross bet-  
ween a fungus and a turnip. The root  
was broken off in each case for they  
had not the patience to dig down to  
full depth and thought that no one  
ever had had. The portion produced was  
in each case about a foot long. The head  
and neck are pink shading off to a dull  
brown and when you slice the thing it  
is white inside and moist. The follow-  
ing rough sketches may give some idea  
of this curious plant:




The Bedouins eat this root and my Mun-  
shi ventured on our specimens and made  
a hearty meal off them. We are going  
full S.W. with an inclination if any-  
thing S. The hamla stopped at 3.40 and  
the length of our march I estimate at  
35 miles, or 20 miles from Rigai. We  
turned to the left and halted on the  
bank of a torrent bed. Some Soliba are  
encamped on the opposite bank and in-  
form us that Hafar is twice as far off  
as Rigai. The Bedouins seem to have no  
idea of the distance. One of them has  
never seen Hafar and the rest only once  
or twice in their lives. Our halting  
place is called the Tharabin from the  
low mounds on —————













41 36


us over 9 miles so that I place Hafar at 40 miles from our last camp or 60 miles from Rigai. There was a good deal of "Hush . Hush" and getting out of rifles as night fell which was at first quite exciting but grew painfully monotonous at the end of an hour's jogging through the darkness. We never saw the haala that night though we heard their camels grunting somewhere in the darkness and it turned out that they passed us and camped for the night a mile further on. There is no firewood in the close vicinity of the wells and we had no water but fortunately the weather was cloudy and the night mild.

Thursday 25th January. The morning gave us an opportunity of seeing El Hafar. All that I could gather in the darkness of last night was that we kept trending more and more to our left i.e. southwards and it would appear that the road ~~on~~<sup>is</sup> still more southerly in the direction of El Kasim but this is merely hearsay. The wells are situated in the middle of the shaib which here becomes a large circular plain of about three miles diameter. The Batin from bank to bank must be quite 8 miles <sup>across</sup> Hafar hill a long low sandy hill lies to the S. by E. of the wells. Hafar wells number about forty but only eleven are alive to use the Bedouin expression. They average a depth of 150 feet and the water is almost tepid. One can see the vapour





















443  
and H.P. from Bulayj ul Janooobiya to  
*rising gently all the way. From Umm-ul-Amara*  
Umm ul Amara, it descends to the Shag.  
The ridge is hardly noticeable and I,  
at least, should certainly have cross-  
ed it without knowing it. On our road  
to-day, we saw some Untair servants of  
Ud-Dowish. They bolted on our approach  
and subsequently fired on Amr'aykhan  
who followed them up to get news. No  
one seemed to consider the circumstance  
unusual or to require even an expla-  
nation, much less an apology. The hamia  
reached our halting place on the Mo-  
sannah at 4.20 p.m. so we made 28 miles  
to-day.  
Saturday 27th January. The hamia start-  
ed at 6.40 a.m. and came in at 4.30  
p.m. so we completed 28 miles. A ga-  
zelle that Amr'aykhan shot last night  
was found half eaten by foxes next  
morning but the Bedouins eat it none  
the less. We met a Rashidi with a  
flock of sheep and bought one from  
him. We went along the Mosannah most  
of to-days march but at length left it  
on our left.  
Sunday 28th January. We pushed on a  
bit this morning with the only result  
of losing our hamia. We halted till  
late in the afternoon till they were  
almost up to us and could see us clear-  
ly but in the course of another hour  
they were lost again and we never saw  
them all night. I reckon we made 24  
miles to-day. We were halted in Abal-  
hizan a very large khabra which at  
least one torrent helps to fill. This








45  
is bounded up on the east by a natural ridge which I place at 93 miles from Hafar. This ridge and Ul Mosannah are the only landmarks on the route so far. We had a dinner of dates and meat washed down with black coffee. About 3 hours after dinner, the rain came ~~down~~ on and the wind was from all quarters at once, so our night could hardly be called comfortable. Monday 29th January. I shook up the Bedouins at break of day on a very dull dark morning with something of a shimal blowing. One went off to fill the kirby at last night's rain puddles and two others managed between them to light a fire in spite of wet wood and a slight drizzle. We then set off to find the haala and located them by their camels grunting as they were being loaded up somewhere to our N.W. After a breakfast of dates and meat we started to follow them. We drenched our rakaib and filled the kirby at the water hole of Abalhiran which will I told, hold water for a month after last night's rain and then it was trotting hard for an hour and a half until we reached the ridge of Salaa' 8 miles N.E. of the ridge of Abalhiran and higher. A traveller from Subaihiya to Hafar would ordinarily leave it on his right but our haala had gone N. We caught them at Salaa' and set our course E. with a very little N. in it. The day's march was about 20 miles. We halted at 3 p.m. in an absolutely








46 (46)  
featureless plain still in Dibdiba.  
This seems an appropriate moment for  
discussing the etymology of this word.  
The Bedouins assured me that it had  
something to do with losing one's way  
but it seems to be the place where one  
"creeps" along trying to keep one's  
direction and wavering uncertainly to  
right and left. The snake here is a  
dābba and his track is very similar  
to that of a Bedouin guide. The ups  
and downs are just enough to hide even  
camels at a comparatively short dis-  
tance and yet so gradual as to be al-  
most imperceptible and quite charac-  
terless.

Tuesday 30th January. The haala left  
camp at 7.10 a.m. but the rikaib, taking  
a lesson from our previous experiences,  
stayed over the camp fire till 8.0 to  
give them a start. Four miles  
brought us to the full view of the E.  
bank of the Shag. From here a Bedouin  
can recognize the Subaihiya land which  
is slightly lower and to the right of  
the highest ridge. We saw on our track  
own the western bank and to our right  
the low plateau of Garaa whence the  
Bedouins bring in "nasi" a coarse  
forage grass for Kuwait.

The Manāgīsh are a collection of whitish  
whitish hills about 10 miles away a  
good landmark with a water hole (thamila)

From here to go to Jahra one would  
leave them on the right and to go to  
Kuwait on the left. Again going from  
Subaihiya to Jahra they would lie on






47<sup>(2)</sup>  
the left. We took two hours to cross the Shag valley from top of west to top of east bank and the dividing line between the hamth and the arafij is half way in the khabra ud Dowish. Last year this khabra was so I was told very nearly the same scene of a tribal fight between the Ajman and the Uteyr as both wished for its possession, until Sheikh Mobarak intervened and gave the right to the Dowish, the ~~xxxxxx~~ Sheikh of the Uteyr.


On our right the Shag seems to trend westward leaving its north and south course. From the Khabra to our first camp in the Shag was 6 hours marching and it goes as much more further north. I was told however that it went a good deal further south and west, as much as, five days marching, say 150 miles. At 2.10 p.m. we first saw Borgan and shortly afterwards Wara and I took bearings 89° and 74° respectively and halted. According to the hamla's marching, we have done 32 miles to-day and are still nearly 4 hours from Subaihiya wells but as I have fixed our camp, we can push straight into Koweit now.

I estimate Subaihiya ¼ from Hafar according to our marching hours at 145 miles from Hafar but what with tired camels and zigzag marching it is probably at least 10 miles less.

Wednesday 31st January. The hamla, it was arranged, would follow slowly in two days but the rakaib left camp at 6.45 a.m. and went fast and steadily








48 (48)  
till noon when we saw 'Ul Mutla' across  
the bay. We left Burgan and Wara on  
our right and later on the well marked  
ridge of Adan. On the left we saw the  
Chabi plateau. Our general direction  
was 35°. We reached Koweit at 4 p.m.  
and found Sheikh Mobarak seated in  
the Safah and went up to greet him.  
Although we were only a day late, the  
fact of no news / having been received  
of us along the Jahra road had made him  
anxious and he expressed himself very  
glad to see us. The usual news of the  
road was given supplemented by Erbid's  
official report and we took our leave.  
Our only casualty on the road was one  
baggage camel, always a weak one, left  
behind on Ul Mosannah. The baggage  
came in next day and it is worth noting  
that the same men who had been so  
obstructive at Jahra, worked willingly  
and well throughout the journey and  
gave no trouble whatever. In spite of  
hunger, thirst, cold and rain everybody  
kept fit and well.

*J. M. Al-Faraj*

Captain,

Political Agent, Koweit.


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
List of vernacular words used in the report.	
A'athariyāt	الماذريات
Abulhiran	البحيران
Adān	عبدان
Agthai	اقضي
As-Sāida	الساده
Atraf	اطراف
Atwal-uth-Thaffir	اطوال الضفير
Atwal-ul-Qateyr	اطوال المطير
Awralin	اولين
Waleyj-ul-Janoobiya	فليج الجنوبيه
Waleyj-ush-Shamaliyn	فليج الشماليه
Farida	فريده
Garaa	فرجه
Grayn	كرين
Hafer	حفر
Inheydeyn	انهيدين
Kasr-i-Ballal	قصر بلال
Khabra-ul-Bal	خبر كبعل
Khabra-ul-Paragh	خبر الفراف
Kha-i-Sadda	خه كساره
Kharja	خرجه
Managish	مناقيش
Mosannah	مسناه
'MR'oos	ام روس
Mutla'	مطلع
Rahaya	ارحيه
Rashaida-Rashidi	رشايد رشيد
Rigai	رقي
Sadiq	تارج
Sadda ridge	
Salaa'	سلي
Sedeyr	سدير
Shag	شف
Soliba	صليه







Subaihiya	صباحه 50
Thaffir	
Tharabin	ضاربين
Ud-Daleybiya	لدليمية
Ud-Dowish	لدوينش
Umm Anara	ام عاره
Umm Khurjin	ام خرجين
Umm Atweynich	ام اتوينج
Unteyr	امطيلع
Unteyliya	امطيلع
Umm-ul-Hamir	ام حمير
Us-Safa	لصافة
Wara	واره
Arafij	مرفع
Hanla	حله
Hazem	حزم
Khabra	خبره
Nasi	نضي
Rakaib	ركايب
Safa	صفاة
Shaib	شعيب
Sudd	سدد
Thamila	ثمله
Maxum	
Turthooth.	طرتوث





























for Political Resident in Turkish Arabia &  
H.B.M.'s Consul General, Baghdad.







Confidential.


From His Britannic Majesty's Consulate at Basrah to  
His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, No. 1,  
dated 4th January 1906.

Sir,

There has been a marked improvement during the past  
year in the relations of the Sheikh of Koweit with the Vali  
of Basrah. This change has been noticed since their meeting  
at Seifwan in February 1905. The Vali's attitude towards  
Mubarak is both friendly and conciliatory and the Sheikh,  
on his side, seems to do all he can to meet Muklis Pasha's  
wishes, both by subscribing liberally to the military bar-  
racks, which have recently been erected at Basrah, and to  
which Mubarak contributed T. £ 625: by regularly forwarding  
deserters from the Turkish troops in Ghassim, who made their  
way to Koweit, and by safeguarding the postal communication  
between Basrah and Hassa, which continues by way of Koweit,  
as reported in my telegram 56 of November 4th 1905.

The Sheikh of Koweit's imprisoned agent Abdul Aziz es  
Sahin, who was released and sent to Koweit with letters on  
November 29th last as reported has not returned.

There is frequent interchange of letters between the  
Vali and the Sheikh of Koweit and, as far as I have been  
able to learn, the correspondence is couched in very friendly  
terms.





56


terms, the Sheikh styling himself "Kaimmakam of Koweit" and signing "your sincere friend". The bearer of one of these letters was Mubarak's overseer at Fao, who got into difficulty in October 1904 and applied for protection and asylum on board one of His Majesty's ships, as reported by Mr. Monahan in his telegrams 56 and 65 of that year. As this man is now employed as a go-between he would not appear to be any longer in danger of molestation by the Turkish authorities.


It is said that 40 men including 13 officers, deserters from Ghassia arrived in Koweit at the end of December and that arrangements are being made by Mubarak to convey them to Basrah.


Instructions have lately been given by the Vali to the Kolagassi in charge of the fort at Fao not to prevent the construction of embankments on the Sheikh's property at Fao, provided the work does not interfere with the fort. The Vali, in thinking the Sheikh of Koweit for his assistance in recovering deserters, requests him to continue to collect as many as he can and forward them. Orders have also been given to the officer in charge of the fort at Um Ksar to show all deference to Mubarak on his way from Koweit to Safwan, from which I conclude that the

Sheikh

















59  
in Ghassim, who made their way to  
Kuwait, and by safeguarding the postal  
communication between Nasra and  
Kuwait, this continues by way of  
Kuwait, as reported in my telegram  
to you of Nov. 4, 1900.

The Sheikh of Kuwait imprisoned  
agent, Abdul Aziz is Salim, who  
was released and sent to Kuwait  
with letters on Nov 29 last as re-  
-porter, has not returned.

There is frequent interchange  
of letters between the Emir and the  
Sheikh of Kuwait and, as far as  
I have been able to learn, the co-  
-respondence is conducted in very  
friendly terms. The Sheikh styling  
himself 'Emir of Kuwait and  
signing 'your sincere friend'. The  
bearer of one of these letters was  
Dumbarah.





68  
 Imbaraki vessel as Ias has got into  
 difficulty in October 1904 and applied  
 for protection and asylum on board  
 one of His ships, as reported by  
 Mr Monahan in his telegrams of  
 and 35 of this year. As this man  
 is now employed as a go between he  
 would not appear to be any longer in  
 danger of molestation by the Turkish  
 authorities.  
 It is said that no men including  
 13 officers, deserters from Ghassian  
 arrived in Nasra at the end of Dec:  
 and that arrangements are being  
 made by Imbaraki to convey them  
 to Nasra.  
 Instructions have lately been  
 given by the Vali to the for assistance  
 in cases of the for Ias not to  
~~prevent~~ prevent the construction of  
 embankments on the Sheikh's  
 property as Ias, provided that the  
 work does not interfere with the for.  
 The Vali, in maintaining the Sheikh's






61  
of Norris for his assistance in recover-  
-ing despatches, requests him to con-  
-vince to others as many as he  
can and forward them. Orders  
have also been given to the officer  
in charge of the post at Um Kar-  
to show due deference to Mubarak;  
on his way from Norris to Japan;  
from which I conclude that the  
British intend to visit this region  
soon. I have no in-  
formation on the subject.


These incidents indicate the  
establishment of more friendly  
relations between Norris and the  
Village than formerly existed.  
The Vasi may have some ulterior  
motives but I have not yet been  
able to discover it. 10. Japan.

Copy forwarded to His Resident  
Busheir with the compliments of  
the undersigned.  
Nasra.  
March 3. 1906.


Japan


His (name)













[Confidential.]

No. 620, dated Bushire, the 18th (received 27th) March 1906.

From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.L.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,  
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Having spent three days at Koweit during last week, I have the honour to submit, for the information of Government, a few observations regarding the present aspect of affairs there.

I met Sheikh Mubarak on three occasions, and on 7th instant had a lengthy interview with him at the Agency, for the details of which I beg reference to the attached memorandum drawn up for me by Captain Knox who was likewise present.

It will be seen that during it several topics were touched upon, some of which are subjects of separate correspondence.

2. The trend of our conversation regarding the affairs of Central Arabia, which was started by Sheikh Mubarak, is of some significance. The possibility of the Ruler of Koweit smoking the calumet of peace with Bin Rashid, and Mubarak's own vision of a three-cornered compact between himself, Bin Rashid and Bin Saood, which would in practice probably be found to amount to a defensive alliance for resistance to Turkish expansion in Nejd and Hassa, is an interesting, if somewhat utopian, prospect to contemplate.

It is to be feared however that Sheikh Mubarak's own ambitions, as indicated in the second of the conditions suggested by him to Bin Rashid, are likely to form the chief obstacle to such a development.

On the other hand, there is no doubt that in the course of the strife of the last few years both Bin Saood and Bin Rashid must have been brought to realise what a strong position the Ruler of Koweit, territorially situated as he is, occupies both strategically and politically in relation to them, and they evidently see the advantage of maintaining friendly relations with him.

In connection with Bin Saood's doings I may remark it is possible that his recent telegram to the Porte was sent to disarm suspicion preparatory to some further move, as recent reports from Bahrein show that the Turks are now having trouble at Hofuf, in which it seems possible, if not probable, that Bin Saood has had an indirect hand.

3. As for Sheikh Mubarak's attitude towards ourselves, I do not consider that on the whole it gives any present cause for dissatisfaction or anxiety; rather the contrary. As long as the practical expression of his sentiments in regard to us undergoes no change, the improvement of the relations between Mubarak and the Turkish authorities at Basrah, within reasonable limits, is rather a convenience to us than otherwise. The Sheikh's treatment of our Agent and his invariable demeanour towards myself could not be more satisfactory and sensible than it is. He has always treated Captain Knox exceedingly well; more so than ever lately, and it is a matter of satisfaction to me as it will, I am sure, be to Government that our representative seems clearly to have gained Sheikh Mubarak's personal regard, and that he is visited freely in a friendly way by many of the Sheikh's subjects. He is thus making useful influence of a kind which seems to be all we require at present and which we can legitimately cultivate.

It is only in regard to the arms question that the position at the present moment leaves much to be desired, and this is partly owing to the fact that the general question of the Gulf arms traffic is *sub judice*. I do not know quite what line to take with the Sheikh in the event of our having an exhaustive exchange of views in this connection, and until I am sure of our intentions it seems better for me to keep off the subject and avoid any specific discussion with him.

4. The question of the conveyance of the Turkish postal bag to Al Hassa, of which a good deal has been said, has I think been somewhat misunderstood, and I concur with the Political Agent in thinking that there

5628 F. D.





is nothing in the existing working arrangement which need cause us to take exception to, or be exercised by, Sheikh Mubarak's connection with it.

Note of a conversation between the Resident in the Persian Gulf and SHEIKH MUBARAK of Koweit, dated 7th March 1906.

On 7th March 1906, at 4 p.m., the Sheikh of Koweit returned the informal visit paid by the Resident on the previous day.

The present interview lasted about an hour and a half, and Sheikh Mubarak was friendly and cordial as usual.

The Sheikh informed the Resident that he thought he would be interested to hear that he had lately, on 24th February (29th Zi-ul-Hajj), received a letter from Bin Rashid couched in friendly language and proposing that Sheikh Mubarak should be on the same terms of friendship with him as the Rulers of Koweit had been with his uncle and grandfather before him. The Sheikh said that he had replied to Bin Rashid that he, Mubarak, was a man who loved peace and quietness and would welcome friendly relations with him, provided that Bin Rashid would keep within his own boundaries and not harass his neighbours, and was really sincere in his desire for peace.

The Resident, in the way of friendly interest, asked how peace could be arranged between the two; whether a personal meeting would be necessary or whether trusted messengers would be sent.

The Sheikh replied that it would be done by correspondence and that a meeting would be unnecessary. He proceeded to sketch the terms on which, in his opinion, a reconciliation between him and Bin Rashid could be considered practicable.

These were:—

- (i) That Bin Rashid should have Chhaffa (Kaffa) and Hail, and the Bedouins of Jebel Shammar.
- (ii) That he, Bin Sabah, should have Koweit, Aneyza, Boreyda, Sedeyr, and Washm and should control the tribes occupying them.
- (iii) That Bin Saood should have Nejd and the Wadi Dowasir.

The Resident asked if Sheikh Mubarak thought that he would be able to keep the parties to their agreement with himself and with one another; and the Sheikh replied that he could.

The Resident then asked whether under such circumstances Bin Rashid would have sufficient income to enable him to live without harrying his neighbours, and Sheikh Mubarak replied that he would have Hail and Chhaffa, the Zakat of Shammar and the produce of forays on the Harb and Aneyza tribes between Hail and Medina.

Asked what view the Turks would, in his opinion, take of this triple alliance, Sheikh Mubarak replied that they would undoubtedly regard it with disfavour.

The Resident then asked whether the relations between Sheikh Mubarak and Bin Saood continued the same as formerly; to which Sheikh Mubarak replied that they did, and that Bin Saood still listened to his advice. Major Cox then thanked the Sheikh for his co-operation in ascertaining the truth regarding Bin Saood's alleged intention to visit Oman.

Mubarak rejoined that Seyyid Feisal of Maskat had also written to him and that he had told His Highness that there was no cause for apprehension, and that Bin Saood had quite enough to do where he was for some time to come.

A reference was then made to the long telegram sent from Bushire to Constantinople through Jasim bin Thani on behalf of Bin Saood. Sheikh Mubarak was asked what inference he drew from the fact that Bin Saood had not consulted him before, and regarding its despatch. The Sheikh said that he had received full details from Bin Saood's messenger, Mussad bin Suweilim,



who sent the telegram, but admitted that he had heard nothing on the subject direct from the Bin Saood family or from Abd-ur-Rahman. He thought this was because the telegram had been inspired by Sheikh Jasim bin Thani, of whom he spoke in no very favourable terms.

Sheikh Mubarak next mentioned that Nasir bin Mubarak of the El Khalifah family had just been paying him one of his periodical visits and had only left a couple of days before. He continued that Nasir had told him of his meeting with Captain Prideaux, and had gone on to ask him (Sheikh Mubarak) to put in a good word for him to the Resident with a view to a reconciliation being effected between himself and Sheikh Esa.

Sheikh Mubarak agreed with the Resident in thinking that Sheikh Esa would resent any overtures on behalf of Nasir Mubarak, and that it would be difficult to alter the latter's circumstances during Sheikh Esa's lifetime.

(4) A distinctive flag for Koweit.

The Resident then introduced the topic of the flag and ships' articles to be carried by Koweit vessels.

It may be mentioned here that the Resident had brought with him a specimen flag of the pattern previously selected by Sheikh Mubarak with the addition of the word "Koweit" in Roman letters as well as Arabic.

The "articles" were read over to the Sheikh and it was explained that it was proposed that the English translation should be verified by the signature of the Political Agent, and this the Sheikh considered would be an advantage. Sheikh Mubarak approved of the "articles" with the exception of the item "Name of Nakhoda." To this he objected, as the Nakhodas were always changing.

The Sheikh then inspected the flag, and after doing so said that he would lay before the Resident what appeared to him the objections to the use of the flag as now shown him, and that then, if the Resident did not consider the objections of any weight, he would be prepared to order his subjects to adopt the new pattern.

The Sheikh then explained his objections at some length. He recited his grievances against the Turks and their oppression in the matter of his Fao date gardens and their ingratitude for all he had done in their behalf. He clearly showed that he considered that all the trouble he experienced at their hands was due to his friendly attitude towards the British Government. [He laid some stress on the fact that on an occasion when the Basrah Commandant came to call on His Majesty's Consul at Basrah, and one of the Sheikh's servants happened to be in the room, the Consul instead of openly acknowledging Sheikh Mubarak's position and recommending his servant to the good offices of high Turkish officers, told the servant to scuttle away and hide himself.]

Might be eliminated.

P. Z. Cox.

He said in conclusion that he would accept the flag as it stood if we would give him a written guarantee to protect him against any consequences that might arise to him from its use.

It proved, on further enquiry, that it was the addition of the English characters to which he objected. The reason for this addition was thoroughly explained to him, but the explanation did not remove his objections and he was therefore told that the European lettering was only a useful addition and not an essential, and he then expressed himself as quite ready to adopt the flag, without the English letters, and combined with the "Articles," for use by his subjects.

Sheikh Mubarak next informed the Resident that Bin Rashid had sent a messenger to Meshhed Ali, who had laid hands on all the money belonging to Yusuf bin Ibrahim in that place.

Sheikh Mubarak then went on to explain that he too had claims against the house of Bin Ibrahim; that account books, in Arab merchants' dealings, were the only evidence, and that the deposits belonging to himself in the hands





of Abdul Aziz bin Ibrahim, the present representative, amounted to Rs. 1,30,000, and that the advances against him were Rs. 70,000 showing a balance of Rs. 60,000 in his favour.



He said that Abdul Aziz at present resided at Surat in the Bombay Presidency and would certainly contest the claim, and that he (Sheikh Mubarak) would be glad of assistance from the Resident to enable him to obtain a settlement of the accounts and the payment of the balance due to him. He said he would be glad to appoint an Agent who would take the account books to Bombay for examination.



In this connection Sheikh Mubarak seemed to be only putting forward a feeler and did not make any definite proposals.



In conclusion the Resident asked Sheikh Mubarak whether he could inform Government that his affairs generally were, as they seemed to be, in a satisfactory and prosperous condition. Mubarak replied that they were. Asked, "as regards the Turkish authorities?" he rejoined, "yes; just at present they are satisfactory but it costs me £1,500 Turkish a year in douceurs to their officials to maintain that position."

The Sheikh then expressed his gratitude for the amount of British protection received; declared that the peace and rest he now enjoyed were, he knew, the result of British support; and that he desired no other or better protectors. He concluded by referring to the pleasant relations which existed between himself and the British representative.

















74  
general worthiness, to have the  
way to his contemplated attack  
on Hara! ~~Then~~ Musaad thinks  
that Bin Saud is at the bottom  
of the recent trouble in Hofuf,  
reported in my diary of this  
week, but whether he is or not,  
it seems pretty certain that he  
will be tempted to take advantage  
of it, & Musaad, who leaves




tomorrow for Lussel, expects to be  
back again in Bahrain & Bushire  
at an early date with more  
telegrams. I told him that I  
thought the Amir was acting un-  
wisely in telegraphing in this style  
to the Turks, as, if he admits  
himself to be an Ottoman subject  
& then goes into rebellion, we  
can't possibly help him. He replied  
that the Amir has always been  
careful not to give himself away  
in writing or by telegraph at all,











78  
instructed him to see if he can find out  
anything there. He is of opinion that  
Salih and his friends are not capable  
of doing much as none of them is as  
clever as, or prepared to spend money  
as, Yusuf did; but it remains to be seen  
if he will give up or become more active  
as a result of his brother's death. Murgin  
Hanga expects the latter.


The late Razook Anqarli was one of Sheikh  
Mulanet's friends and it is suspected that  
<sup>his</sup> murder was organized by bin Rashid  
and bin Ibrahim's agents.


As to Sheikh Mulanet's nephews, Murgin











proceeding on the part of Bin  
Saood.

He then introduced me to  
Abdul Aziz bin Badar & I told  
the latter to come & see me  
which he did on Monday  
morning. I did not get much  
out of him & am ashamed  
to have to own that this was  
mostly due to the extreme  
difficulty I found in  
understanding him.

He got into complicated  
Turkish law terms & used  
mutilated foreign words &  
the Bussorah dialect but





I gathered that he had dispatched  
200 soldiers to Bussorah, that  
in some few cases he had to  
pay for redeeming their weapons  
& did not care to deem the  
Turkish Government for such  
a trifle.


The form his punishment  
has taken is very light & he  
owned that all the hardship  
he laboured under was a  
certain difficulty in transacting  
business & looking after his  
date gardens in Bussorah &  
the necessity of reporting his  
movements to the Turkish




authorities. One night will it  
open arrest.


He told me that a previous Wali  
had admitted that he was a  
victim of oppression & that his  
imprisonment was inflicted  
with the view of putting  
pressure on the Sheikh of Kuwait.


It seems to me that Kuwait  
treats me better than ever.  
I have made more acquaintances  
& people are all very civil &  
obliging. As I am too modest  
to attribute this to my own  
charms, I keep wondering  
what this lull before the storm  
means. The Turks have not





























[Confidential.]

No. 835, dated Bushire, the 12th (received 23rd) April 1906.

From—CAPTAIN A. P. TREVOR, I.A., First Assistant Resident, Persian Gulf,

To—SIR LOUIS W. DANE, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the marginally noted letter which I have received from the Political Agent, Koweit, enclosing notes made by him during his tour to the south of Koweit.

2. I have not made any communication to the Superintendent, Persian Gulf Gazetteer.

No. 112, dated the 28th March 1906.

From—CAPTAIN S. G. KNOX, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit,


To—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to forward herewith the copy of some notes made during a short tour to the south of Koweit which may perhaps prove of interest. I would ask that the notes on the old Arab cemetery near Wara might be forwarded to the Superintendent, Persian Gulf Gazetteer.

*Notes of a tour by Captain S. G. Knox to the south of Koweit.*

*Saturday, 24th March.*—About 2 P.M. Sheikh Dialij and I started out on our tour. He had got for me a good black mare which, he told me, was Bin Saood's gift of last year to Sheikh Malieh, Dialij's brother. Malieh told me later that he used to be a partizan of (Ibn) Rashid but that Bin Saood had brought him round by the gift of this mare, some camels and some money. He complained of Arab veterinary surgery and said that the Bedouins had fired the mare for a cold and ruined her. Though quiet and easy paced, she was sluggish.

We passed round by the Ras-ul-Arz beacon and found it absolutely sound though it would be the better for another coating of tar or even two. We saw a number of the townsmen's encampments on our road especially near the base of the Ras-ul-Arz. As we were approaching Funtass, we overtook an old man on a donkey who insisted on our stopping the night with him. It turned out to be a Jabir of the Al-i-Subah but he might easily have been mistaken for an old Arab fisherman. His pedigree connects in the following way:—



He must be a man of about 50 years old or even more, although he is a generation below the Sheikh; he is a good deal older than any of Sheikh Mubarak's sons. He gave us an excellent pillau of fowls in a decent little diwaniya facing the sea at Funtass and was very anxious to know if everything was to my liking. While we were waiting for dinner, Sheikh Salim, Sheikh Mubarak's





second son, came along to give me greeting. I cannot place this man. He has, as I think I have said before elsewhere, a great reputation among the Arabs but, behind a rather solemn, stately demeanour, he appears to me rude, sly or stupid or a combination of all three. One thing may, I think, be safely reckoned on that he will give Jabir, the rightful heir, a lot of trouble when Sheikh Mubarak dies.

After his first greeting to me, he plunged straight into local politics with Diaij. A rumour has come hot foot from Koweit that Sheikh Mubarak and Bin Rashid have made friends. It reached Koweit this morning before we left.

*Sunday, 25th March.*—We were out and on horseback fairly early this morning and rode on to Abou Haleyfa where Malieh has a fort. As we passed out of Funtass, I noticed an uncommonly nice filly tethered by an Arab tent. Diaij told me that she belonged to Abdulla el Brahim er Rashid of the old Sheikh's family of Zubair, who was paying Sheikh Salim a visit. His sons were in such bad odour with the people of Zubair that they rose up against them and said that they would kill them, if they did not get out of the town.

We could not find Malieh at once, so we sauntered round the cultivation which seems fresher, greener and better cared for than it did at the time of my last year's visit.

The desert on the other hand was a good deal browner and wanted rain badly. (This rain fell yesterday, 27th March 1906.)

After exhausting the resources of Abu Haleyfa, we returned to Malieh's diwaniya; he came in almost at once and skilfully clearing out everybody, including his own brother Diaij, he told me to make a note of the fact that he had a claim on the Fao date-gardens which he intended to press on the old man's death, not now, he explained carefully, for he was afraid. He claims a half share on account of Ali, his son by his wife Haya, daughter of Subah and Mubarak's sister. He was going to ask me and the Resident to interfere. I said that it looked to me as if we should decline to move in the matter which seemed one for the Turkish Courts. He said "never mind! I am going to ask you later on and no one knows of this, not even my own brother, Diaij."

Malieh decided to ride with us to the tents of Bishr bin Roomi, the father of the Koweit pearl merchants, and then on to the treasure pillar which we had come all this way to see. About 11 A.M., we found the tents pitched in a hollow on the western slope of Adan ridge. We came first to the women's tents, four large ones, and went on to the Diwaniya tent, pitched about 200 yards away. Here Diaij woke up the Arabs slumbering after a heavy breakfast, by bringing down a kite with his shot gun and they came out rubbing their eyes and settling their Kafiya to welcome us. Coffee came at once and breakfast shortly. A big bowl of sourish milk with butter floating in it formed the principal dish. There were plates of honey and the Bahrein citron jam, dates of course and the common sweetmeat, rahush of date juice and sesame flour. Thin wafer-like *chupattis* of about 18 inches diameter served as bread.

After breakfast, we rode off to the treasure pillar. This is a story from last Ramzan but it reached Koweit only a fortnight ago when Sheikh Jabir brought the *saru* in from camp. An Awazimi had a dream telling him to dig by the Rijui-Sufaur and they gathered a party and went off to dig. As night fell, they found masonry and the dream, dreamt thrice by the way, was coming true and the party decided to come back and dig again the next day. They camped some little distance off and, in the night, one of the party saw a light at the ruins. He went up and saw two Dawasirs of their company playing the rogue and digging on their own account. They said that they had found nothing but fled the next day and have not been seen since.

The Awazimi continued digging and found remains of masonry in good condition but only, so it is said, one copper pice which Sheikh Mubarak handed over to me and I sent to the Superintendent, Persian Gulf Gazetteer.

On the way, Malieh rode along with me; poor Diaij had fallen behind, explaining to me that honey never agreed with him. This gave Malieh his





opportunity of talking high treason for, though they will trust an Englishman, they will not trust their own brother and I betray no confidence for all they tell me is intended to reach Government. Mubarak was a miser who had 39 sources of income, none of which however helped to fill the mouths of his poorer kinsfolk. All was kept for himself and his sons. From the time of Sheikh Jabir, the grandfather, all the previous Sheikhs had drawn a date ration from the Turkish Government as Kaimmokams but the pay was stopped after the murders. In the old days, the Sheikh served out this ration to the various members of the Subah family and the Sheikh's predecessors had been "ajaweed."

"This man had, it was true, brought the Sheikhdome to a pitch of power never before dreamt of (I pictured to myself the Sheikh of Koweit whom Pelly speaks of as sitting the whole afternoon on Koweit strand to see Pelly's boat floated and wondered when Mubarak would do the like for me) and he went out with a swelling purse to gain the plaudits of the beggars of the market place but completely neglected his poorer relatives.

He would not even like my talking with Malieh or listening to this conversation." There was an artless obviousness about this last remark that made it difficult to repress a smile.

Malieh had compromised the claim of Ali at the time of the murders—half to himself and half to Sheikh Mubarak—but, since the English had come in and Mubarak's position had become more secure, he had ceased to pay even that half.


We reached the spot in the early afternoon and found that it had been dug into irregularly everywhere by the treasure seeking Bedouins, who have irretrievably ruined any chance of preserving and uncovering these interesting monuments. Otherwise this might have been done at a small cost.


I took bearings—to Wara hill 258° and to the west hill of Burgan 214°. We found the remnants of a man's skull in one tomb and I think it probable that the place is nothing but a cemetery of the old time kings of Wara. Anywhere but in Arabia they would be called village headmen. Unmoved, I have overheard myself described as "of the kings of the English". I measured one of the tombs in the best preservation. It may be described as a box of the best *Fus* or local mortar about 4 inches thick. The length was 5 feet 1 inch (73 thara or cubits), breadth 1 foot 8 inches (2 thara) and height about 2 feet. The whole buried about 5 to 6 feet including the 2 feet depth of box. The graves lie east and west and probably the head to the west, judging from the position of the skull bones we found. No inscriptions.

There are a large number of stones, apparently piled on top of the *Fus* boxes. They are irregular in shape and average about 2 cubic feet. They must have come all the way from Wara, a distance of 6 miles. It would require a sturdy camel to carry any two of them. A space of 100 feet square would cover all the stones and graves as I judge. They are on high ground and the present Wara cultivation lies between them and Wara hill.


We returned to Bishr's tents and dined and slept the night there. Nothing could exceed the pleasant hospitality of their welcome and the same might be said of the pleasant reception I met with everywhere along this tour. The old man Bishr wanted to know when I would come again and was interesting about the Ceylon pearl fisheries and asked me for information of which I had less than he. He told me that he had ventured his all this season and spoke of his divers as his sons, told me that if it was a failure he would sell me his house on the "seef." He said he would have been glad to have contracted with the Ceylon Government for their fisheries but they would have none of him. He predicted that the Company which was now buying would run the business at a loss after the first three years as there was grave danger of the fisheries being overfished when they would either never recover or only after a very long period.


Our return journey direct to Koweit was without incident.


















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(73)

at \_\_\_\_\_

Main \_\_\_\_\_

Minor. \_\_\_\_\_

by \_\_\_\_\_

INDO-EUROPEAN TELEGRAPH DEPARTMENT

Daily No. \_\_\_\_\_

7/5/88 190

Monthly No. \_\_\_\_\_


from \_\_\_\_\_

Trans. at	Class.	No.	Words.	Original date and time tendered by sender.	OFFICIAL INSTRUCTIONS.
Main _____					
Minor. _____					
by _____					Vid _____

To Dear Turan

Flt. has passed. Bourgeois Henjam t  
 Heynsens Bnashir Solat al month's  
 delegate and the Consular Agents of France  
 and of Turkey want Peraopolis over  
 mozaffer to go fais to settle claims  
 Please answer at once in Hendjam the boat  
 being waiting for reply —

(2) From Local Subjects Neyd Bnashir to Secretary  
 Imperial Grand Vizier Constantinople  
 Governor Neyd Najib Pasha and Beg Bachee  
 Mahmood are creating disturbance here we are  
 afraid bin Saood will seize the country advise  
 arrange send immediately reliable Governor  
 Yours truly  
 S. P. K. K.







106

INDO-EUROPEAN TELEGRAPH DEPARTMENT.

Recd. at Con. deshal Daily No. 7-6 Monthly No. 1906

Trans. at Dear Hassa Original date and time tendered by sender. OFFICIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

The following was sent yesterday

Secretary Grand Vizier Constantinople

People Hassa have previously advised you and

Bene Velayet of Disloyalty Governor and

Mahmood Bey and their friendship with Benisood

and losses sustained in consequence

favour of your immediate attention the

matter is desired either by appointing

another Governor or causing enquiry to

be made


From Alli bin Abdullah bin Issa


Sender Signs Abool Kassim

Yours Sincerely

*[Signature]*









exercising my mind perhaps more  
than it should is the way that  
Sheikh Mubarak & myself are  
drifting apart. His last visit  
was paid to me on the 25<sup>th</sup> May  
& the visit before that was  
paid on the 13<sup>th</sup> March. Of  
course, during March & April  
he was out in camp a lot but  
still I do not think that he  
should allow 20 days to pass  
without coming to visit me.  
Here are dates collected from  
the diaries.

7<sup>th</sup> & 13<sup>th</sup> March Sheikh's visits





11<sup>th</sup> March Sheikh left Koweit.  
26<sup>th</sup> do. visit of Jalir  
9<sup>th</sup> to 14<sup>th</sup> April. Sheikh in  
Koweit. No visit paid to me,  
though that is accounted for by  
the fact that I spent a good deal  
of my time on board the Hermes.  
17<sup>th</sup> April Jalir's visit  
19<sup>th</sup> do. do.  
11<sup>th</sup> May. Sheikh returned to Koweit.  
19<sup>th</sup> to 21<sup>st</sup> May. Sheikh in camp.  
25<sup>th</sup> May. Sheikh's visit.

Besides this, he never told me  
of Khalid ul Awn's visit, nor has  
he mentioned his own early  
departure for Muhammerah.  
I don't know how far I have a  
right to expect him to keep me




enforced in such matters but  
I think it would only be civil.

For the present, I have  
convinced myself to letting  
him know through our respective  
Mollahs that I have noticed  
that he does not return my  
visits & that it will look odd if  
in the diaries in which all  
such visits are recorded the  
Resident sees the P. A. constantly  
visiting the Sheikh but no return  
visits being paid.

When the Sheikh is in camp,  
Jalir too neglects me pretty  
consistently. Thus from the 17<sup>th</sup>  
March to the 11<sup>th</sup> May, he visited  
me three times &, when he came





on the 19<sup>th</sup> April, it was to find out what mischief Sheikh Diar & I were plotting together.

Of course, my private feelings (though I hate a frost between the chief I am looking after & myself) are of no importance but I think there is a courtesy due to the British representative which should be observed & that I have no right to overlook it.

To sulk in my own house because my visits are not returned seems rather more futile than to go on paying visits without





receiving any & I should be glad  
of instructions as to what course  
of action to pursue, in case the  
informal remonstrance I have  
put in bears no fruit or, what  
is still more likely, bears fruit  
for a short time & then the  
visits are allowed, through  
slackness, again to fall into  
arrear. I believe it is only  
slackness though it is just  
possible that it may be with  
a view of heightening his own  
importance.

I may mention that the



fact of the Sheikh's not paying  
his visits has attracted some  
attention in Kuwait & people  
are talking (I think unreasonably)  
of the Sheikh inclining towards  
the Turk. He probably is upset  
by his friend the Wali's dismissal  
& I think it not improbable  
that he will try & see some  
Turkish officials on his visit  
to Muhammarah with a view  
to squaring things with the  
new regime.

I have a minor kind of  
influence with him but  
unfortunately it takes the  
form of his manoeuvring to



outwit me instead of his  
accepting my proposals. I  
hamper him but do not stop  
him.

As regards the general attitude  
of the merchants, I have nothing  
to complain of. They come to  
my house nearly every evening  
& talk freely & pleasantly &  
I am careful to avoid controversial  
subjects. They never ask  
themselves but will always  
come when asked. To this I  
must make an exception, a  
very recent & rather curious one.  
The other day, Sheikh Noosa,  
about whom I have had a





good deal to say in connection  
with the arms trade, asked  
to be allowed to come.

I gathered that it was with  
the view of removing an unfort-  
unate impression but, though  
he was very polite & friendly, we  
talked as if we had never  
heard of such a thing as a  
rifle in our lives.

I may note here with regard  
to Khalid al Awn's visit that  
a man who ought to know  
commented that it would



never have been paid, if there  
had been a Wali in Basra  
but that Khalid had taken the  
opportunity of no high official  
being present in the Ulayat  
to slip away.

Please forgive a long rambling  
letter on many subjects &  
believe me

Yours sincerely

J. A. R.

P.S. By the way, if you  
should think it right to



address the Sheikh on the visit  
question, please don't do so  
without consulting me first.  
If my remonstrance should  
bear fruit & a letter come,  
it might cause unpleasantness.  
If nothing comes of my action,  
perhaps a letter from you  
would be the best thing  
to be done JK






Gulf has become <sup>1176</sup> very hostile & suspicious of our intentions of late. (8-B)


Since Imbarak's return from M'rah, I have not been to see him & he has not visited me. I should be glad of instructions on this subject. For the past month & more, neither he nor Sheikh Sabir have visited me

Yours sincerely

S. K. R.

P.S. Imbarak's last visit









*Copy in file 2/3 (Arms)*

*Belt  
No. 416*

BUSHIRE RESIDENCY.  
Reg. No. 416  
Date June 16  
CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS.

105

The main objects of Sheikh Khalid's visit are said to be


- (1) To reconcile the Bin Saood and Bin Rashid families.
- (2) To make arrangements to smuggle arms and ammunition into Turkish Arabia.


It is said that Sheikh Mobarak will impose an export duty of reals four per each rifle exported from Koweit and that he will issue such a certificate as without betraying himself will show Khalid bin Aon whence the arms have come. Khalid will also recover reals 4 per rifle and allow the consignment to pass into Turkish territory without difficulty.

The Sheikh has warned the merchants smuggling arms of the above arrangement and his own servants who watch the trade to keep it strictly confidential and not to allow it to reach the ears of the British Consul or his staff.

The informant also states that Sheikh Mobarak some days ago, in conversation with some merchants said that he had informed the British Consul here that arms are not imported here by bugalows but they are imported by steamers and that he ( British Consul ) should not be so inquisitive about the arms trade here. Some of the merchants sitting there told Sheikh Mobarak that the reason why the English wish to stop the


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





the importation of arms here is plain; on a convenient opportunity, they will seize Koweit which, if the Arabs have no arms, will be defenceless. The condition of Fahrein and its Sheikh is greatly exercising their minds. He (the Sheikh of Fahrein) has been made to sit down in a corner like a widow without any voice. If he were to go against the British and do anything he will at once be taken to Bombay like his nephew Ali. (sic) The Sheikh has, it is said, told some of the merchants that he has not done a foolish thing like the Sheikh of Fahrein. He has got a document from the British saying that they will be here like his other subjects and that they will never interfere in the affairs of this country. If he sees anything opposed to this, he will be against the British.






























(Received on the 14th May 1906, with the Political Secretary's letter No. 17, dated 27th April 1906)

ASIATIC TURKEY.

[April 9.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 3.

No. 1.

Sir N. O'Connor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 224. Secret and Confidential.)

Sir,

Constantinople, April 3, 1906.

I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, reporting the outbreak of serious disturbances at Suk-el-Shiyukh, in the Muntifik, owing to the refusal of the El Hacham (Hidjam) tribes to pay the Government taxes, and the efforts of the local authorities to collect them.

I have received through a secret and confidential source confirmation of the serious character of the revolt of these tribes, and of the repulse suffered by the Imperial troops which were dispatched against them.

The Grand Vizier, in a communication addressed to the Minister of War, states that the Vali of Bussorah had telegraphed that on the 24th ultimo, in a conflict between the troops and the Arab tribes, 100 soldiers were killed or wounded, and their Commander, Colonel Moustapha Bey, having lost his head, the Mutessarif of Amara, together with Lieutenant-Colonel Aziz Bey, who was in the district, had been dispatched in all haste to the scene of the encounter with detachments of troops, which were immediately mobilized from all sides.

The Minister of War replied that telegraphic instructions had been sent to the Vali and Commandant of Bussorah to proceed at once to the scene of the encounter with a considerable force collected from the surrounding districts, and also to the General of the VIth Army Corps to proceed to the spot in all haste with a considerable force taken from the head-quarters of the corps.

In a subsequent message the Grand Vizier communicated to the Minister of War a further telegram from the Vali of Bussorah, pointing out the impossibility of putting down the rebel tribes with the military force which had been dispatched to Suk-el-Shiyukh, and urging that three more battalions, 800 strong, should be sent at once to the scene of action.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Consul Crow to Sir N. O'Connor.

(No. 11.)



Sir,

Bussorah, March 5, 1906.

There has been serious trouble among the Arabs at Suk-el-Shiyukh, in the Sanjak of Muntifik, resulting in considerable loss of life on the side of the Turkish troops, and the immediate recall of the Mutessarif of Muntifik to Constantinople. The cause of the disturbances appears to have been the persistent refusal of the El Hacham tribes during the past two years to pay taxes to Government, and the attempts of the authorities to enforce payment.

1





On the 11th ultimo the town of Suk-el-Shiyukh was surrounded by El Hacham Arabs, the inhabitants were under arms, temporary fortifications were thrown up, and fighting was going on. The El Hacham were aided by the Abu Hameydi and El Hassan tribes, and, as affairs were becoming serious, urgent representations were made to Bussorah for the dispatch of troops. 500 Redifs were sent from Nasriye and 200 from Amara, while 300 soldiers proceeded from Bussorah to the scene of action; 30 gendarmes, under Lieutenant Suleyman Effendi, were attacked by the El Hacham Arabs on their way to Suk-el-Shiyukh, and Suleyman Effendi was wounded. The Mutessarif of Nasriye and the Commandant of the troops proceeded to Suk-el-Shiyukh to direct operations, and artillery was used against the Arabs, who were finally repulsed, it is believed, after loss of life and destruction of property. The accounts of the fighting are, however, disjointed and confused, and up to the time of my leaving Amara on the 1st instant it was not clear to the minds of the Bussorah authorities what had precisely occurred. It is known on the Turkish side 16 soldiers were killed and 14 wounded, including a Major slightly and a Colonel Agassi severely wounded. I hear that the Mutessarif of Muntifik has left for Constantinople in obedience to a summons from the Sultan, who is said to be distressed at the loss of life occasioned by the disturbances.

I have, &c.



(Signed) F. E. CROW.


*Extract from the Diary of the Political Resident in Turkish Arabia for the week ending 21st May 1906.*

I have just received an official notice that the post which left Baghdad for Damascus on the 26th April has been lost. It is only a short time ago that one of the mail carriers on this line was murdered on his way to Baghdad.

There is a chronic feud between the Shumurd and Zugurd tribes of Arabs who live in and near Nedjef. This has once more reached an acute stage. Abbas, son of the Sheikh of the Shumurd, has just been shot in the shrine at Nedjef, and it is said that the tribes have told the pilgrims to leave the place as they mean to have a free fight. I am informing the Vali of the news which has reached me and asking him to take steps to protect the lives and property of British subjects.









113  
Extract from the diary of the Pol. Resdt. in Turkish Arabia for  
the week ending 28-5-6.


-----  
Please see entry in this Office diary for the week ending 7th May  
1906. The following is a copy of a report sent by H.B.M's Consul at  
Basrah to H.B.M's Ambassador at Constantinople under date 12-5-6.

-----  
"I have received the following account from the Vali of events  
at Suk-el-Shiyuk subsequent to the fighting reported in my despatch  
No. 11 of March 5th last.

"A succession of officials during the past three years have  
vainly tried to get the Arabs in Muntafik to pay their taxes which  
the latter state were unfairly assessed from the first, their lands  
and crops being rated out of all proportion to their value by the  
Local Government. The arrears are now considerable and the Govern-  
ment refuses to accept any reduction. Early in March the Mutasarif  
of Amarah was transferred temporarily to Nasariyeh, but his efforts  
to effect a settlement were not successful and the fighting continued.  
On April 17th the Vali himself received orders to pro-  
ceed to Muntafik with sufficient troops to restore order. The El  
Hacham and other Arab tribes round Suk-e-Shiyuk were by this time  
in open rebellion, and encouraged by their previous success against  
the Govt. troops, were no longer in the mood for parley. The Vali's  
proposals for a settlement of the taxation question on more  
suitable terms were rejected and certain small forts, occupied

by








114


by the rebels, near the town had to be reduced. Friendly Arabs, who offered themselves as guides, and who appear to have treacherously misled the Vali and persuaded him to allow them to act as his advanced guard in order to lure him into danger, proceeded to turn the rebels out of the fort nearest the town. This was accomplished without opposition and the Vali marched after them himself with four battalions and two field guns and occupied the place. He then directed his Arab irregulars to execute the same manoeuvre in regard to the next fort. They absolutely declined to go on and while the discussion was being prolonged the hostile Arabs closed round the fort in large numbers and poured in a destructive and unexpected fire. The friendly Arabs fled and the Vali surrounded by a force superior to his own in numbers and better armed, seems to have been unable to use his artillery and was compelled to cut his way back to the town across reeds, marsh and rice fields, or date gardens intersected by broad irrigation channels, country ill-suited for military operations and rendering the task, *of dragging the guns* by no means easy. He reached Suk-el-Shiyukh in the evening of a pitiable plight with the loss of fourteen killed and twenty-four wounded, according to his own account and only saved his guns with the greatest difficulty.

"The rebels surrounded the town and sniped all

night







115  
night but retired and disappeared completely in the day  
time. The Arabs of Muntafik remained practically in open  
rebellion and the Vali, on reporting the circumstances  
was, as I informed Your Excellency by telegram on the  
11th instant, immediately summoned to Constantinople.



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

diary of the  
Extract from the/Pol. Revt. in Turkish Arabia for the  
week ending 28-5-6.

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

The Vice-Consul at Karbala reports that fighting  
has been going on at Nejed from the 17th to the 21st May  
and that the Shumurs and Zugurs still occupy their  
fortified posts. In the course of the disturbance some  
Persian subjects are said to have been killed, the larger  
bazar is said to have been looted, and I have heard that  
two British subjects have been robbed.


On the 12th May an attempt was made to board one of  
Lynch & Co's steamers. It is now reported that on the 11th  
May a Turkish steamer was robbed of some bale of goods  
near, and above the junction of the Euphrates and Tigris,  
that the Turkish steamer which left Baghdad on the 20th  
May was fired at, and that another Turkish steamer which  
left















































2/0 copy. filed in 53 I 123 (96)

Copy of a letter dated 30th July 1906, from Major P. Z. Cox,  
C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire, to  
Shaikh Mubarak al Subah, Koweit.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX


(After greeting and inquiry after his health.)

When I last visited Koweit with His Excellency The Admiral  
I was very sorry to miss seeing you owing to your absence from  
Koweit, but I thought it was on account of the severe illness  
of your deceased son Fahd <sup>and</sup> at a time of anxiety ~~and~~ did not trouble  
you with letters. Since then, as you may have heard from Captain  
Knox, I have been continuously absent from headquarters, and  
only returned two days ago after two months in India.

It grieves me much to read on my return that in the short  
time of my absence your two sons Fahd and Sabah have been taken  
from you. This is a heavy calamity and I beg you to accept my  
deepest sympathy in your bereavement. It is difficult for us to  
understand these things; but we must bow to the will of God. Please  
convey my condolences also to your son Shaikh Jabir.

Another matter too has been a source of much regret to me to  
read and this is that while I have been away some misunder-  
standing has interfered with the pleasant and frequent intercourse  
which had always been customary between you and Captain Knox. I  
am delighted to learn however by the mail which has come just  
after my own return, that any little estrangement that there may  
have







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have been has now been removed,


I have always found your relations with Captain Knox so pleasant when I have visited Koweit that it would be a great disappointment to me if anything were to come between you and him. As, I am sure, is not hidden from you, it is the unchanging wish of my Government and its Officers to honour you and maintain your dignity in every way possible: and I cannot doubt, but that it is your own wish also to reciprocate in this respect and remembering that our trusted representative at Koweit ~~the~~ <sup>being</sup> the only Englishman in your territory, should have an honourable and honoured position in your eyes, and those of your subjects I hope that this will always be the case.

Now regarding my absence ~~of~~ in India I went first to Simla and was honoured with a visit to the new Viceroy His Excellency Lord Minto, who talked to me about the affairs of the Gulf. His good will to you and interest in your affairs and prosperity is no less than that of his honoured predecessor Lord Curzon. With regard to the latter you will, I know, be very sorry to hear that within the last few days he has suffered a grievous calamity in the death of his wife Lady Curzon, after a short illness,


Perhaps you would like to send him a letter or telegram of condolence. He would, I am sure, appreciate it. If you care to send any message to me I will forward it to its destination.

On









On my return from Simla I went to Bombay to look at some steam launches, and there I saw and talked with Shaikh Ali bin Ahmed of Bahrain. He is importuning much to be allowed to return to Bahrain, and, if Shaikh Esa can give guarantee \$ for his good behaviour I may be able to recommend Government to let him go back before very long. I think he should have learnt wisdom by now and will not give trouble again. This is all the news that I have.


What is your news? What is the state of things in Nejd and the state of your relations with Bin Saood and with the family of bin Rashid?

Finally I trust you had a pleasant visit to our friend Shaikh Khazal and found him in the best of health and prosperity.

I hope I shall receive your esteemed letter before long and hear good news from your side.

May you be preserved .

P. K. B.








126<sup>(99)</sup>

1907






























130  
Extract from the diary of the Political Resident  
in Turkish Arabia for the week ending 18th June 1906.

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
15. The disturbances at Nedjef still continue. Sheikh  
Atiya, Zugurd, was said to have collected a number of  
men for the purpose of rescuing the Sheikhs who had  
fallen into the hands of the Turks. (see para:3).


I now hear that the arrested Sheikhs have been  
brought to Baghdad and that the members of the tribes  
at Nedjef are trying, by intimidation, to make the  
Mujtahids use their influence to get released the men  
who have been arrested. Communication between Karbala  
and Nedjef was stopped, but has since been reopened.


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















Enclosure in Foreign Office covering letter of  
the 11th June 1906.

No.371  
(19098)

Pera,  
29th May 1906.

Received on 9th July 1906 with Political Secretary's  
letter No.25 dated 22nd June 1906.


Sir,

I have the honour to report that I have  
received telegraphic information from His Majesty's  
Acting Consul General at Baghdad, as well as from His  
Majesty's Consul at Basra, of an unsuccessful attempt  
made by some hundred Arabs on the 12th instant, to  
board the steamer "Mejidieh" belonging to Messrs. Lynch  
and Company at a spot some thirty miles north of Kurna.


Major Ramsay further states that two  
Turkish steamers on the Tigris are reported to have  
been fired upon and three passengers killed. He has  
applied to the local authorities to protect British  
Steamers, and he has offered Mr. Consul Crow the  
services of the Royal Indian Marine Ship "Comet" and  
also those of Mr. Gaskin, should they be found necessary

I have, etc.,  
Sd/- N. R. O'Connor.


Sir E. Grey, Bart., M.P.,  
etc., etc.,



















136  
Copy sent to Foreign  
office on 1942 of 1946  
in file 9/43  
١٣٦  
من مبادرتك الصالح حاكم الكويت الرفيع ذو الشرف والجلال الخ من اجل ما كان لي من فضل جليل في دولة الكويت التي اتي اليها في جيل قديم  
غني اهله اوفى اللام ابن بل وسعد العن شريف ذلك انما الميزه ههنا في محل الزواجا والسن الساعا شرفا با اكرم  
المرحوم ٨ ح ١٤٤٢ تلوته مسرود في حال صحتهم وما اوتيتهم صادم مقلنا اوتيتهم من خصمنا جند ذو الشرف والجلال  
المرحوم الخ من اجل ما كان لي من فضل جليل في دولة الكويت التي اتي اليها في جيل قديم غني اهله اوفى اللام ابن بل وسعد العن شريف ذلك انما الميزه ههنا في محل الزواجا والسن الساعا شرفا با اكرم  
واخت بعد القدر ثلاثة ايام مع انه اني خيرون في ابرار متفرق المذبح لاني احسن ما يجتمع واجاب وعند اقا متني  
بالبلد زاد على احراف المذبح والعائله جميعهم باجره وقد راء ذلك خضه المذبح فبطان ناسي ومن قصه سلبت  
خطفكم العاليه الي يا مخلصكم ذلك من حسن تفهمكم واجادي علمهم يا حب هذا حال الدنيا آتيتهم انصوص محنا  
المذبح فبطان ناسي الذي ههنا عندي بمنزلة الخ فمنا دأبنا انشاء احترم ونفرد الوفاة الجليل بين وجهين اول  
خدمه وطاقه من الدولة اليه والوجه الاخر ايضا لشخصه الزجل مجا ورد واتي ايضا جاء على نفسي مأمورا مثلم  
لجانب الدولة اليه فايقنا ان ترا من خيرون فبطان ناسي انشاء مخالفة ليس معتمد ههنا ليعرف حقيقة اني اقاوم  
بالاومر وانتيهه ومع هذا ولي استبه له وللب على عند خيرون العاليه بعد ههنا ليعرف حقيقة اني اقاوم  
اوتم اني مخلصكم دأبنا انشاء انشاء الدولة بالزفة والملاحه ذلك ثابت عندي احسن اسقا متني وخلفه من الجاهل  
العالى و محبتي لطفكم اوتيتهم عن اخبار الجند فضل ان يستقل عبد العزيز الرشيد راء نفسه انه محبتي عليا ومبشر  
فضائلهم عند قبلهم وههنا وراء النقص الكلي فجل وسائل الى الصالح ومع هذا من ذو مستين اننا ناربهم  
لأن الرضا الذي فيه كافيته واعطاه الصالح وكان عند اسر كل حال وبشر جميع من له محبته ثم بعد  
قله ارسلونا ملاسيب وهما ابنة متب وشيخ العبيد الرشيد وطان ولد كذا الرشيد وبلخون ابني الصدوق ورجل  
منا ودهع النظر عليهم واعطاهم ذلك فبعد ذلك سعيهم وبن ابن سفيان انشاء من يبا اتم صلهم وان  
سفيان ابن رشيد محافظين على طلب رضانا لاننا اخب الصالح لكل امر خيرون العاليه من خصمنا جند ذو الشرف والجلال  
صاحب انصوص ههنا من ينسب المظلم لهدى كوزن فاننا محسبون ايضا كسبر علمهم وللد في هذا الجند لان كل  
بلد ههنا الشخص العالي بلدي واجب محسبون لخطرتهم العاليه انما سدد ان اقدم تلفرا من خيرون العاليه وطلعت ههنا  
ناظرنا وون بطر الاصل انه الذي اوتيتهم يصل واجز التلفوا اننا نعلمها مع المحفنة واولم العاليه  
بوضاهه ههنا يوم اجتمعت معا في ١٢ ابريل اخذت من يد فبطان ناسي وانا مسير عليه في محله اوتيتهم ههنا على  
ومع اجرة خيرون العاليه لم ينجبني ويسرهم الرجوع وان اذا اخيونا شيخ عيسى بضمه انه على حسن  
السيد بعد ان ترا حيفه الدولة برحمتهم قبل الملك ما اذا اخيونا شيخ عيسى بعد ما صا حبت  
عليه افواه الناس والرجاء على ابن اخيه علي ما تنسب عن العقل بقيت بعد ما بقا لم يميز وعلى  
المدور اذا بعد حادق ولزم ونبهته فلكم اليد الطائمه على اجمع واما عفتكم البه حادق  
واني محبكم انشاء بعد التاريخ في يوم التجمع الرعلي الفاء البكر الضيفي احاصه





٧  
الشيخ ربه انشاء الله تعالى هو الذي من عظماء ادينا ما نلهمنا تاهل في محله انشاء  
يوم واحد هذا وقد قونا بيارهم وودعهم ساجدة انسيان ١٢ جمادى الاولى ١٢٤٤






Copy sent to Foreign vice aer (No)  
Letter No. 1942 of 1906 in file 2/138  
D/12 Jemadi II 1324  
3 August 1906

From,  
Sheikh Mubarek el Subah  
Chief of Kuwait.

To,  
Major Cox, A. B. M's Political Resident  
and Consul General  
A. C., In the most fortunate time I was  
honoured by (receiving) your <sup>honoured</sup> illustrious letter  
dated 8<sup>th</sup> Jemadi II 1324 and was glad to learn  
(30 July 1906)  
your well-being, and I understood all what  
you had stated.

As regards what you had remarked  
about His Excellency the Admiral; my friend,  
I was exceedingly grateful to be present at  
the service of you all, and I came as promised  
and stayed for three days after the (lapse of  
the) time fixed. Although I was indisposed  
when I came from Jahrah, but I did so in  
order to pay (my) respects to you all and




139  
~~converse with you~~  
~~answer your call~~, During my stay in  
town, my indisposition increased, and all  
my family were at Jahrah. Captain Knox  
had noticed this.

As regards your sympathy with  
me, this is due to your cordiality <sup>towards me</sup> ~~(with me)~~  
And as to what had befallen them (ie. <sup>his</sup> ~~the~~ decision <sup>son</sup>),  
such are the ways of the world.

With regard to what you had said  
about my friend, Captain Knox, who is to me  
like a brother; if God please, I will always  
hold him in esteem and pay him high -  
reverence, for two reasons, firstly because of  
my duty - and loyalty to the Government,  
and secondly for his personality and for our  
<sup>social intercourse</sup> ~~his association~~. I consider myself to be









141  
After Ibn Rashid had found himself <sup>in fault-</sup> ~~guilty~~  
with regard to me, <sup>for</sup> ~~against~~ my virtues (or excellent qualities)  
had become apparent.  
~~were well known~~ to him, and he also perceived  
that he had incurred great losses. So, he  
interceded for peace - although it was about  
2 years that I had left him alone, because  
(difficult) the circumstances in which he was <sup>involved</sup> were sufficient  
for him. And I granted him true peace. -  
After he was murdered, letters were addressed  
to me by his son, Mitab, Hammood el-  
Obaid el-Rashid and Sultan son of Hammood  
el-Rashid praying for the maintenance of  
(my) friendship and asking me to have  
an eye to them. I granted this to them.  
Subsequently, I intervened between them  
and Ibn Saood for peace. If God please,



142<sup>(112)</sup>

their reconciliation will be completed shortly.  
Both Mr. Saood and Mr. Rashid try to attract  
my <sup>goodwill</sup> ~~pleasure~~, because I wish the good of all.  
You <sup>made mention of</sup> ~~had written about~~ His Excellency  
Lord Curzon and ~~about~~ the death of his  
honoured wife, Lady Curzon. God knows that  
I have also been greatly shocked by this news,  
because anything which vexes this illustrious  
personage will also vex me. And as <sup>becoming</sup> ~~requiring~~  
by my dependence to you, I <sup>venture</sup> ~~take the liberty~~  
of <sup>to enclose</sup> ~~sending you~~ a telegram in this letter.  
I trust you will order it to be wired <sup>as</sup> ~~because~~  
if sent through you it  
~~anything under your control~~ will reach its  
destination <sup>safely</sup> ~~E.~~ and I will pay the Telegraph  
charges with thanks.  
I received your <sup>honoured</sup> ~~illustrated~~ letter






143

by the hand of Captain Knox  
Today, Friday corresponding with the 12<sup>th</sup> inst. -  
I had gone to him in his place.

You had written about Ali bin  
Almed. Khalifah that he had interviewed you  
in Bombay and solicited to come back and  
that if my brother <sup>Sheikh</sup> Isa, guarantees that Ali  
will behave properly, you can then make  
a reference to the Government for his coming  
back before the time. If my brother Sheikh  
Isa do not recover from his negligence after  
what the people have said against him  
and after what had befallen to his  
nephew, Ali, then he <sup>must</sup> ~~will~~ <sup>be considered to</sup> certainly have  
~~left him~~ <sup>left him</sup>  
no discretion ~~(in judgement)~~ <sup>left for</sup>  
~~him~~. If after making such overtures,  
he is ~~alleged to return~~ <sup>alleged to return</sup>  
~~the affair~~ <sup>he takes up his duties</sup>





144 (13)  
Your arm can reach him as  
~~you will then have a hand extended to all~~  
well as others (where necessary) and  
(that is to say, you can exercise control  
over all). Your pardon <sup>is</sup> great.


If God please, I <sup>am about to</sup> will proceed to my property at  
Tao to farm out the produces and <sup>hope also</sup> will also.


I <sup>shall</sup> ~~shall~~ <sup>hope</sup> to  
if God please, interview my brother Sheikh  
Khazal Khan. If I did not want to

trouble him (by inviting him to come to me)


I shall go to him in his place ~~for~~ a day.


(Usual complimentary ending).

















147


5/12 Jemadi II 1324  
3 August 1908


His Excellency  
Lord Curzon.

I was <sup>much</sup> shocked by death of your august  
spouse. This is a great bereavement for me <sup>also</sup>,  
and I Beg to offer condolence and pray God <sup>that</sup>  
~~you may be granted~~ <sup>resignation and solace</sup> ~~you patience and~~ ~~our~~.

Was it not requisite (for me)  
to offer condolence, I would have not troubled  
you by this. But in order to express regret  
and to act upon obligation, I expected  
offering condolence and pray from God  
and that you ~~may be preserved from further~~  
~~will not experience any sorrow for here~~  
after this affliction.

Chief of Koweit,  
Mubarek Elsabah.





P.R. This is the receipt  
(p. R. 74.13) for Sheikh  
Mubarak's telegram  
to Lord Curzon.

I expect the amt.  
to be refunded to me?


n.s.s.  
1/9.

Yes - it will be refunded  
by Sh. Mubarak.

3/9/06

ME





(Copy).

148

178

To,

His Excellency Lord Curzon.

1 Carlton House Terrace  
London.

I was much shocked by death of your august spouse.  
This is a great bereavement for me also and I beg to  
offer condolence and pray God that you may be granted  
resignation and solace, and that you may be preserved  
from further affliction.

Sheikh Mubarek of Kuwait

Chief of Kuwait.

MS

Mubarek-us-Sabah.

HP

MS


By cheapest & safe route

HP





"ملف (D 8 53/7 V) شؤون الكويت والقبائل العربية" [١٧ ظب] (٥٣١/٢٥٠)











No. 607 of 1906.

From

Major J. Ramsay C. I. E.,  
Offg: Political Resident in Turkish Arabia  
& Acting British Consul General  
B A G H D A D.

To

Sir Lewis W. Dene, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.,  
Secretary to the Government of India  
in the Foreign Department, Simla.

British Residency & Consulate General  
Baghdad, 9th July 1906.

Sir,


In continuation of my letter No. 523 dated the 9th July  
1906 I have the honour to forward for the information of the  
Government of India a copy of my despatch No. 605  
58 dated 9th July  
1906 to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, together with  
a copy of its enclosures.

2. I also enclose a copy of despatch No. 12 dated 6th March  
1906 from His Majesty's Consul at Busrah to His Excellency the  
Ambassador.


I have, etc.,


Sd/- J. Ramsay, Major,

Offg: Political Resident in Turkish Arabia  
& Acting British Consul General  
B A G H D A D.












152 (121)  
is also in charge of Basrah he (Majid Bey) informed me on the 4th June 1906 that the attacks on the steamers had been caused by the puerile behaviour of some silly Arabs of the Amarah tribe. The next thing I heard ~~that~~ was that Sheikh ~~Emx~~ Gazban had erected a mud fort on the Bank of the Tigris and I have satisfied myself that the report is correct.

3. Majid Bey went to Amarah to hold an enquiry and arrive at some settlement, he took with him the Makib of Baghdad. The current belief is that the Vali wishes to give the disputed tract known as Kumait to a nominee of Gazban's, whose name I have not been able to learn, and that Gazban has obtained a decision in his favour by the familiar process of bribing the Vali. It is said that he has paid £.T. 2,500 and there is some reason to think that the story is approximately correct. I knew that Gazban's agent came from Amarah to Baghdad in the "Khalifah" and it is said that he sent a telegram to Gazban at Amarah to the following effect "the garden question is settled. A thousand Liras more are required which send by Emis". Emis is Gazban's secretary and he came to Baghdad, it is said <sup>with</sup> that Liras 1,000. It is reported that the Makib is opposed to the Vali's proceedings as he considers them likely to lead to bloodshed.

4. Subsequent events also lend ~~to~~ colour to the story given above. On the 7th July I received information from the Agent of

the







153 123  
the Euphrates & Tigris Steam Navigation Company that the Turkish steamer "Burhamiya" had been fired at below Amarah. I telegraphed to the Vali for information and I enclose a translation of his reply. The Vali does not say whether the steamer was hit or not. She is expected to arrive shortly in Baghdad, and if I find that she has been hit I will telegraph to Your Excellency.

5. Mr. Gaskin hears, on what he considers good authority, that the Bani Lam pay about £.T.8,000 in taxes, exclusive of the rest of Kumait, and that the Albu Muhammad pay annually £.T.46,000 as taxes and £.T. 75,000 to the Samiye administration. Mr. Gaskin has also heard that Sheikh Seyheed has written to the Sultan to say that he means to cause disturbances as this seems the best way of ensuring official favour.

I have, etc.,

Sd/- J. Ramsay, Major.


Copy of a letter No. 137 dated 18th June 1906 from H.B.M.'s Consul General at Baghdad, to His Excellency the Vali of Baghdad.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's letter No. 34 dated the 4th June 1906.

2. In this letter Your Excellency describes the recent

aytsak









154 (24)  
attack on the British steamer Khalifah as the result of the  
puerile behaviour of some Silly Arabs of the Amarah tribes. I  
think it is right that I should inform Your Excellency that I  
consider the incident as one of far too great importance to be  
adequately described in these words. If I have correctly  
understood Your Excellency's meaning it is that no one is  
deserving of punishment and that the matter may be considered  
as satisfactorily closed as soon as an amicable settlement has  
been arrived at for the settlement of the question that gave  
rise to the disturbance. I have ~~xxxx~~<sup>no</sup> means of knowing officially  
what was the nature of the question which originally gave rise  
to the disturbance, but it seems to me to be fairly clear either,  
that the Arabs who fired ~~at~~<sup>on</sup> the "Khalifah" should be punished,  
or that the officials who allowed <sup>local</sup> ~~official~~ disturbances to get  
to such an acute stage should be punished, or that ~~the~~ both the  
Arabs and the officials should be punished.

3. It has perhaps escaped Your Excellency's notice that  
although a British steamer has been fired at, and struck by a  
number of bullets, as I have seen for myself, still no  
expression of regret has been conveyed to the representative  
of the British Government at Baghdad.


I shall be much obliged if Your Excellency will consider  
the desirability of letting me know whether it is proposed to  
mete out any punishment to any one in connection with this  
incident.


Sd/- J. Ramsay, Major.












156  
Extract of a letter dated Basrah 6th March 1906, No. 12,  
from H.B.M.'s Consul General at Basrah to H.B.M.'s Ambassador at  
Constantinople.

.....


At the present time there is considerable friction  
between the Civil authorities represented by the Mutassarif, and  
the officials of the Samiyah department presided over by Hamid  
Pasha. The President of the Samiyah, who administers the  
Imperial domain lands, accuses the Mutassarif of neglecting the  
Sultan's interests and the Vali of Basrah has been despatched by  
Imperial command to patch up the quarrel and solve the  
differences which have arisen between ~~the~~ the tribes of Al bu  
Muhammad and the Bani Lam in regard to the lease of the  
Imperial domain properties. When I reached Amarah I found the  
~~Mutassarif~~ Mutassarif and the Hamid Pasha were not on speaking  
terms, and the latter had directed his staff to have no  
dealings with the Civil officials. Relations between the Vali  
and Hamid Pasha, who is powerfully protected and a man of  
progressive ideas, seemed also to be somewhat strained.

Half of the land at Amarah belongs to the Sultan and  
the other half belongs to the State and is called Mulkiye.  
These lands are farmed out to the tribes on the muqata'a

system








157 (127)  
system at a fixed yearly rental for terms of two, three, or five years, the farmer subletting them to his tribesmen who cultivate them and provide the seed. The Al bu Muhammad whose Sheikh is Seyhood are more numerous apparently than the Beni Lam, who are under the rulership of Gadbah, and are said to pay almost twice the rental of the latter for lands farmed to them. The two tribes are constantly fighting with one another and their borders are contiguous in many places. They both farm lands on the east and west banks of the Tigris.

The matter which is at present occupying the attention of the authorities appear to be somewhat as follows. There is a certain district called Kumeyd belonging to the Saniye department situated on the west bank of the Tigris, which was formerly leased to one Hatab, a son-in-law of Seyhood Sheikh of the Al bu Muhammad tribe. Hatab married Fitna, daughter of Seyhood. He is a Sheikh of the Al bu Daraj who dwells at Kumeyd and acknowledge the Sheikh of the Al bu Muhammad as their overlord. About two years ago there was constant fighting between the Kumeyd people and the Beni Lam who farmed lands near them. Matters became serious, the general peace of the district was disturbed by the quarrel and troops were sent from Baghdad to quell the disorders. The Saniye department decided to deprive Hatab of his lease which had not expired and to relet the ground to one Belassim brother of Gadbah of the Beni Lam. This was between the Beni Lam done on the ground of expediency and to obviate further








158  
further friction between the Bani Lam and Al bu Muhammad, as the (128)  
Al bu Daraj, the dwellers on the soil of Kumeyd appear to follow  
either faction indifferently as one or the other gains the  
ascendency and becomes their overlord for the time being. The matter  
being thus temporarily arranged the troops were withdrawn whereupon  
Gadban apparently distrusting the Sheikh of Kumeyd seized Hatab and  
his four brothers and held them prisoners. Salassin's lease of  
Kumeyd has now expired and the land is to be put up for auction  
again. Hamid Pasha the President of the Saniye has represented to  
the Palace that he can make a better bargain with the Al bu  
Muhammad than with the Bani Lam and can put some 4000 Liras into  
the Sultan's pocket by restoring the Kumeyd lands to Hatab. He seems  
to be somewhat influenced in this decision by Fitna, Hatab's wife  
and daughter of Seyhood, who although already married four times  
and the fifth wife of her present husband, is not devoid of personal  
attractions or without coquetry and, having set her cap at Hamid  
Pasha, is diligently running him in the interest of her imprisoned  
husband, a proceeding which bids fair to disturb the domestic  
tranquility of the President's own household and supplies food for  
the scandal mongers of Amarah. Fitna herself has twice applied to  
this Consulate for assistance but I considered it inadvisable to  
interfere and encourage her to submit her petition directly to the  
Vali himself. The Vali, after due consideration of the matter on the  
spot has, I am informed, ~~xx~~ come to the conclusion that to revert  
to









159 (129)  
to the former arrangement and to establish Hatab in such close proximity to the Bani Lam would be inexpedient and dangerous and lead to further fighting between the tribes. To prevent this it would be necessary to dispossess Gadban of the land he holds near Kumejd and to remove him to some place further afield and such a step could only be taken in the presence of a large body of troops. He has accordingly informed the Minister of the Saniye department at Constantinople of his conclusions and stated that if His Majesty desires the extra 4000 Liras a year and the transfer of the land to the Al bu Muhammed the necessary troops must be sent and the arrangement which cannot be effected without bloodshed will be carried out. Otherwise the lands should remain in possession of the Bani Lam and the question will solve itself.


The Mutasarif is believed to be corrupt and has been won over to Gadban's interest, and the latter is trying to make the power of his purse felt all round and in the meanwhile retains Hatab and his brothers hostages. The hereditary feud between the Al bu Muhammad and Bani Lam is quite inextinguishable and the only practical arrangement would be to place the river Tigris between the two factions and farm out lands to them on its east and west banks respectively thus creating a natural barrier which would act as a powerful deterrent by lessening the opportunities of tribal conflict.

Sd/- F. E. Crow.










161

سيدي و جنابا كبريا.  
I am instructed by His  
Ambassador to follow  
the movements of  
the Saudi and British  
troops as closely  
as possible and I should  
be very grateful for  
your assistance to










163

would be so kind as to let  
us have notice of this  
kind relating to these  
affairs. This would  
be of great assistance  
Jaf.





165  
time - The Basrah Consulate  
does not always see  
Nejd affairs with the  
same eye as we do,  
but of course we should  
endeavour to cooperate  
as far as we can.

I think Mr. Crow does  
send us copies of some  
of his <sup>news</sup> despatches to Lega-  
-tion about the Saood  
but not all.

28/5/06 P.H.C.

PA We chiefly get Nejd  
news thro Koweit, so  
this request of Mr. Crow  
may be communicated  
to Capt. Knox & he be  
asked to furnish such  
information re Nejd  
as may be of assistance  
to <sup>him</sup> Mr. Crow?


153  
28/5/06 29/8.


P.A.


Whatever is done should be mutual,  
should it not? We might ask Capt.  
Knox as above, and ask Mr. Crow  
to reciprocate.

31/8/06.









(Received on 23rd July 1906 with Political Secretary's letter No. 27, dated 6th July 1906.)

ARABIA.  
CONFIDENTIAL.

[June 18.]  
SECTION 2.

No. 1.

*Sir N. O'Connor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 18.)*

(No. 400. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Therapia, June 11, 1906.*

With reference to my despatches No. 292 of the 1st May and No. 309, Secret and Confidential, of the 8th May, relative to the defeat and death of Abdul Aziz Bin Rasbid of Hail, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Acting Consul at Jeddah, reporting the arrival of two messengers from Bin Saud with letters for the Grand Shereef of Mecca and the Vali of the Hedjaz.

It would appear that after his successful encounter with the Emir of Nejd, Bin Saud has proclaimed himself ruler of the whole "Shark" (East), and has sent letters to Constantinople and to the Valis of Bussorah and Bagdad.

As His Majesty's Acting Consul reports that the two messengers who had recently arrived at Jeddah had left for Yambo, and that the rumour is current that Bin Saud has ordered them to proceed to Egypt with a letter addressed to the Khedive, I am forwarding a copy of the inclosure in this despatch to the Earl of Cromer.


What importance is to be attached to Bin Saud's communication cannot be estimated at present, but so far as his character is actually known, neither his military prowess nor his administrative capacity encourages the belief that he will be able successfully to cope with the Ottoman Government, should he decide to proclaim his independence of the Sultan. The development of the question, however, deserves to be carefully watched.

I have, &c,

(Signed) N. R. O'CONNOR.

19







168

Inclosure in No. 1.

*Acting Consul Hussein to Sir N. O'Connor.*

(No. 25.)

Sir,

Jeddah, May 13, 1906.

I have the honour to report that on the 26th ultimo a telegram was received by His Excellency Ahmed Ratib Pasha from Medina that Abdul Aziz Bin Rashid, with 250 followers, was killed in a fight with Bin Saoud. The news gradually filtered through, and on the 28th ultimo I cabled the news to Your Excellency.

A few days later two messengers, bearing letters from Bin Saoud to His Highness the Grand Shereef and His Excellency the Vali, arrived here. I have not been able to see them personally, but the following appears to be the contents of the letters which is also corroborated by the news given out by these messengers to some respectable people of this town and Mecca.

Towards the end of April, Abdul Aziz Bin Rashid moved from his country in a marauding mood, and went to plunder a caravan, consisting of men of Bin Saoud's tribe, which was coming to Nejd from Bagdad with quantities of merchandize and supplies for the Turkish troops. He succeeded in waylaying the caravan and plundering it in a place not far from the camp of Bin Saoud.

It appears that Bin Rashid, being in the country of Bin Saoud, was unaware of his whereabouts at the time, and did not think that Bin Saoud might be so close to the place of his depredations. Bin Rashid had a small following with him which was sufficient to plunder a caravan, but in no way capable to give battle to Bin Saoud.

The Sheikh of the plundered caravan, who knew that Bin Saoud was close by, repaired at once to give him the news, and craved his help to recover the raided property, leaving behind him orders with his men to keep Bin Saoud fully informed of the movements of Bin Rashid.

On receiving the news Bin Saoud lost no time in marching swiftly to attack Bin Rashid with a strong body of men, and overtook him next night while Bin Rashid and his men, loaded with their booty, were encamped in a small valley in a false but perfect sense of security against any attack from an enemy.

A sudden charge of Bin Saoud created unmanageable confusion and panic in the sleeping camp of Bin Rashid, and most of his followers were in flight. But Bin Rashid, with whatever men stood by him, faced the attack, and in regular Arab style declared his presence and recited "rajaz" (verses of war).

Bin Rashid's presence having been found out, a concentrated deadly fire was poured at him, and everything was over in a few minutes.

Bin Rashid was found among the dead, and his head was cut off, and for six days paraded on a pole among the neighbouring tribes.

It is reported that Bin Rashid's own son and one cousin were also killed, but the news is not confirmed.

After this success Bin Saoud has declared himself the ruler of whole "Shark," and has sent letters to Constantinople, to the Valis of Bussorah, Bagdad, Hedjaz, and His Highness the Grand Shereef.

The messengers were well received here both by the Vali and the Grand Shereef, and were rewarded with Khilats in the usual way.


The messengers have left for Yembo, and it is rumoured that they have orders to proceed to Egypt, and have a letter addressed to the Khedive.

I have, &c.,


(Signed) MOHAMMED HUSSEIN.


P. S.—It is hardly believed here that 250 men were killed with Bin Rashid, as the fighting did not last more than a few minutes.


M. H.


























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(139)

J. P. A. Koweit


Sir

I have the honour  
to request that <sup>be good enough to</sup> you will forward  
Copies of such of your <sup>Weekly</sup> diary entries  
as include important or int-  
-resting items of news from Nejd  
Central Arabia, to H. B. M.'s  
Consul Bussorah, who ~~has~~  
~~been asked to reciprocate in~~  
~~letting us have any~~ will be  
glad of the information for  
communication to H. B. M.'s  
Embassy.

31/8/06.

O. H. C.





No. 2072, dated Bushire, the 4th (received 17th) September 1906

From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—SIR LOUIS DANE, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a translated extract from the Busrah Gazette of August 10th-23rd, 1906, regarding Sheikh Mobarak's subscription to the Hedjaz Railway and Mekka Canals fund.

*Extract from the Busrah Gazette of August 10th-23rd, 1906.*

In reply to communications addressed to His Excellency Mubarak-es-Subah Pasha, Kaimakam of Koweit, asking to contribute 200 liras towards the sums ordered to be collected for the Hedjaz Railway and the repairs of the water canals to Mekka, we learn that, instead of 200 liras, 500 liras have been sent. This amount has been received by the Treasury of the Vilayet.

We much appreciate the zeal and religious ardour displayed in this matter by Mubarak Pasha who is proud of his fidelity and obedience to the Imperial Throne and the country.

No. 11.

The foregoing is forwarded with the compliments of the undersigned to His Britannic Majesty's Resident and Consul General, Bushire, for his information.

BRITISH CONSULATE,

BUSRAH;



30th August 1906.



(Sd). F. E. CROW,



*His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Busrah.*

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. C284 F. D.—30-9-06-67—NC.

















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
(١٤٢)

الى الشيخ مبارك الصباح

الموجبة لغير التماسها بعد ما في ايامنا من غير صحة حالكم على الدوام وقرارك  
وقت غايته اسد خا طرنا من وصول كتابك الكرم المودع في دار جابر بن عبد الله  
مع ملفوفته وجميع المطالب المندرجة صحاري بحكم معلوم وقرارك  
جنا بكم فحينها انما رسمت لخصوسكم لعلهم الذين ابدتم في تلوه المنتج  
منه حسيات الوداديه نسبت الى رولة متبوعيتنا واصحاب  
مناصبها فلكم جانا بكم انما ارسلنا صورة تلغراف المرسول  
منكم الى بعض ذوي النوازل والورد كرزون حبيب وقرارك بكم رصيه  
ومرنا حقتنه يتضح لجانا بكم قد بلغ مصروفه اربعة وسبعين ريال  
والله عثرانه فاذا جانا بكم تفضلون بتسليم ذلك لجانا لعلنا  
القبطان ناكركم جانا بكم الى الله يا خله علي في الحب  
حب لظنونا انه بدو لجانا بكم جواب بعضه من طريق الكفا و آياتنا  
اذا ما وصل ذلك الحال اننا نرسل لجانا بكم عليه ترجمه تلغراف العمومي  
المرسول لجانا بكم العظم اللادد كرزون مشعرا اظهار شكره لجميع النوازل  
الذي لعلوا كونه التقرية في عصبته . ايضا شروعات المندرج  
مرفوضه امور تجد فنهاء ونحن سرور لجانا بكم انما جويله معكم  
الجميل سادرك صلاحي او يصير ذلك بين ابي عمود وابنه كرسيد  
ونامل حاله تلك كرزون طرف تكون مستقلة في كرمي والزمان  
ورفع سفك الكرام هذا ما لم يمانه لجانا بكم ولور لعلهم يحرم  
حرفه لعلهم رجب ١٢٤٤ مطابق ١٤ ذو سبتمبر ١٩٠٦

Al





Copy of a letter No 255 dated 4th September 1906,  
from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to  
Sheikh Mobarek-ul-Sabah, Chief of Kuwait.

~~~~~

I was much gratified to receive your honoured letter  
and enclosure of 12th Jamadi-Sani 1324. I understand all  
its contents and thank you for the cordial sentiments  
which you have expressed therein and which are outcome of  
your friendly feelings to my Government and its Officers.



I forwarded your telegram as requested to His Excellency Lord Curzon and send you the receipt thereof herewith from which you will see that the cost was Rs 74/13/-. If you will kindly give that amount to Captain Knox sometime he will credit me with it.


Perhaps you have received a special answer, via Fao. In case you have not I attach the translation of a public telegram issued by Lord Curzon in which he expresses his gratitude to all those who condoled with him in his bereavement.


I understood what you told me about the affairs of Nejd and am very glad to hear that a reconciliation has been completed or is about to be completed between Bin Saeed and bin Rashid-thanks to your good offices. Inshallah quiet will now remain in the country and there will be a cessation of bloodshed.

"May you be preserved and salaam."





























(Copy)

182

(147)

No. 624 of 1906.

From

Major J. Ramsay, C. I. E.,  
Offg: Political Resident in Turkish Arabia  
and Acting British Consul General,  
Baghdad,

To


Sir Louis W. Dane, K. C. I. E., C. S. I.,  
Secretary to the Government of India  
in the Foreign Department, Simla.  
British Residency & Consulate General,  
Baghdad, 16th July 1906.

Sir,


In continuation of my letter No. 607 dated the 8th instant, regarding the disturbances on the lower Tigris, I have the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a statement made to me by the Commander of Messrs Lynch & Co's steamer "Medjidieh".


2. I telegraphed the purport of the above statement to H.B.M.'s Ambassador at Constantinople and His Excellency has informed me that the Grand Vizier has sent most stringent orders to the Commandant at Baghdad and to the officials of the districts adjoining the river to take all necessary measures for the safety of vessels plying on the river.


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
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149  
Statement of Captain Rawlins, of the S.S. "Medjidieh",  
before H.B.M's Consul General at Baghdad on the 12th July 1906.


We left Baghdad on the third of July 1906. It seemed to me that the Arabs are in an unusually excited state between Koot and Jurna. I say this because when the steamer passes it is usual for boys to run alongside and ask for things to be thrown to them: on this voyage men run alongside, threw things at us, and generally showed an excited and unfriendly feeling. When we got below Ezra's Tomb I saw a crowd of about a hundred men, mostly armed, they said nothing to us: but I heard one man say "shoot at him". No shots were however fired.

We started back from ~~Amarah~~ <sup>Basrah</sup> on the 7th July, and at about noon on Sunday, the 8th July we reached a place about 15 miles below Amarah. Here there was a crowd of about 300 or 400 Arabs, mostly armed. They shouted out to us that they would let us pass this time as they had sent an Ultimatum to the Turks, allowing a period of ten days, of which only eight had elapsed. They said that on our return journey they would make

widows








185  
(50)  
widows of all our wives. They were also abusive. At that time we had no flag flying.


When we got to Amarah we heard that the "Burhaniyah" had been fired at near the place where we had seen the Arabs. The story we heard was that 13 shots had been fired and that the shots had been returned from the "Burhaniyah", with the result that one or two Arabs had been hit. The "Burhaniyah" was about two days ahead of us.

Both on the up and down journey the only place where I saw any troops other than those which are always on the river bank, was at Ezra's Tomb. I saw about 20 or 30 soldiers there.

(Sd) F. W. Rawlin.









186

2nd July 1906.


Mr. Lonsdale: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has received information of the murder of several British subjects recently in the vilayets of Baghdad and Basr; and what steps are being taken to restore order in that area, and protect the lives and property of British subjects.


Sir E. Grey: His Majesty's Government have received information of the murder of one British subject, Mr. Glanville, at Maghil, and His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople is giving every attention to the matter. A special Commission is being despatched by the Ottoman Government to concert such measures as are required for the maintenance of order.






















189  
Recd: on 13-8-06 With Pol: Secy's  
Letter, No. 30 dated 27-7-1906.


Sir W.O'Connor to Sir Edward Grey.- (Received July 13, 8 A.M.)

(No. 142.) Therapia, July 12, 1906, 11.40 p.m.


Your telegram No. 106 and my telegram No. 141.


His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah reports only about  
6 feet of water in places above Kurna on Tigris. River  
falling, and gun-boat impracticable. "Comet" could escort  
Lynch steamers, but I have already explained objections to  
this. Fourteen battalions reported to have been sent to  
disturbed district, but, so far, river traffic in statu quo.




















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ARABIA.

[July 9.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

No. 1.

[3214]

Sir N. O'Connor to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 9.)

(No. 449.)

Constantinople, July 3, 1906.

Sir, WITH reference to my despatch No. 400, Confidential, of the 11th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Acting Consul at Jeddah, respecting the state of affairs in the Nejd and Bin Saood.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONNOR.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Acting Consul Mohammed Hussein to Sir N. O'Connor.

(No. 34.)

Jeddah, June 19, 1906.

Sir, I HAVE the honour to report that news has come here that Bin Saood has lately given orders to all the Arab Sheikhs and tribes in Nejd to desist from keeping communication with the Turkish officials and troops, and to stop carrying their mails and supplies, under a threat of severe punishment if his orders were not complied with.

The Sheikhs of tribes who were till now helping the Turks in Nejd have informed the military officers who are with the Turkish troops there that they will have nothing to do with them in future, and that they will not carry their mails and supplies.



This information was sent by the officer in command of the Turkish troops in Nejd to Medina, and was telegraphed to Constantinople, wherefrom order has been given to the Military Mutessarif, who is still in Medina, to march with 600 troops and two guns to the help of the Turkish troops now in Nejd, and take the necessary steps to keep the lines of communication open.


It is also reported that the son of Bin Rashid has also gone out to attack Bin Saood, and has asked the Turkish troops to co-operate with him.

I have, &c.


(Signed) MOHAMMED HUSSEIN.

[2062 i-2]












understood Haji Bekkir. They  
have now returned from Basrah  
and I am told at a private  
meeting with the sheikh ah  
which only one or two of the  
greybeards were present said  
that the Turkish government  
have granted Subia to  
Sheikh Mubarak. Sheikh  
Mubarak is shortly coming  
to Mohammerah, and













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*Confidential*



BUSHIRE.


11 September 1906.

Dear Captain Knox,

Please see this office endorsement No: 2076 dated 4th September 1906. I notice from the office copy of this letter that the first entry in the list of communications forwarded with it is No: 1814 of 8th August 1906. This letter refers to Messrs Lynch importing empty cartridge cases into Koweit. The letter that should have been forwarded to you is number 1942 of 19th August 1906 regarding Sheikh Mobarek and the Arms Traffic generally. Would you please let me know if this latter communication has been forwarded to you or not and if it has been, would you kindly have the entry in the endorsement corrected accordingly.

*Yours sincerely*  
*H. Birdwood*

John S. G. Knox, I. A.,  
Political Agent,  
K O W E I T.







(Confidential)

No. 2138, dated Bushire, the 15th (received 24th) September 1906.

From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—SIR LOUIS DANE, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

I have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a despatch\* addressed by His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Basrah to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

With reference to Mr. Crow's statement as to the channels through which Ibn Saood and Meta'ab bin Rashid respectively receive their allowances, I am addressing the Political Resident at Baghdad and the Political Agent at Koweit on the subject and will forward in due course any further information I may receive from them.

No. 62, dated the 31st August 1906.

From—His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Basrah,

To—His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople.


With reference to my despatch No. 59 of August 25th, I have the honour to report that I called on Lieutenant-General Sudqi Pasha last Wednesday. He had been ordered to Baghdad and left the same evening. It is uncertain whether he will return to take up his appointment as Commandant at Basrah. Sudqi Pasha stated that he had handed over the Command in El Kasim to Sami Pasha, Acting Mutessarif and Commandant and stayed ten days with him after his arrival. Sami Pasha brought 500 soldiers and one gun with him from Medina. The troops arrived in excellent condition.

According to Sudqi Pasha's account there are 2,500 troops in Nejd and El Kasim. The lines of communications are open and caravans arrive freely and, though supplies are not easily obtainable locally, all necessities were forwarded to them by caravans.

Information from other sources does not confirm this favourable account. The tale told by the numerous deserters who have from time to time found their way to Koweit and thence the Basrah during Sudqi Pasha's command in Kasim is a very different one. They describe the state of the troops there as pitiable in the extreme and state that provisions are scarce and they are without pay. Sudqi Pasha himself is said to be owed 2,000 Turkish £ for his services.

Sudqi Pasha said that Ibn Saood was jealous of Saleh bin Mohanna's intercourse with the Turkish Officers and that he got the people of Boreyda to sign a *masbata* complaining of his oppression and then removed him to Riyadh. He attributes his removal to personal animosity. Though Mohanna was appointed Kaimakam of Boreyda by the Mushir, the appointment had not been confirmed by Constantinople.

Sudqi Pasha marched from Boreyda to Zilfi and thence travelled by way of Es Safa and Subakeya to Koweit, crossing the northern end of the Dahna between Koweit and Kasim. From Zilfi onwards he found water once every four days. The journey was performed on camels. He brought 142 men with him and had no casualties. He seems to have travelled very quickly. He told me that peace had been established between Ibn Saood and Ibn Rashid but did not think it would last very long. He described Ibn Saood as a desert diplomatist and the late Abdul Aziz Bin Rashid as a desert warrior and said the former displayed considerable ability and adroitness in his dealings while the latter was a fighting man pure and simple. Meta'ab his son is only 21 and Sudqi Pasha thinks his youth will prevent him from taking any active line for the present, but his ambition to make a name for himself and follow in his father's footsteps may lead to a recurrence of hostilities between the rival factions at no distant date. He stated the Arabs had now all retired to their homes and their pastures.



The murder of Abdul Aziz bin Jilwa, while on his way to Koweit with letter from Ibn Saood, was, I am informed, perpetrated by a raiding party of Shama Arabs who had not heard the news of peace being proclaimed.

I learn that the allowance granted by the Turkish Government to Ibn Saood is by recent arrangement paid through the Sheikh of Koweit, who deducts it from the land tax due to the Government on his Fao property. Meta'ab's allowance is supposed to be paid through Baghdad, but I have not heard of his receiving anything as yet.

I can obtain no confirmation of the report from Jeddah, mentioned in Your Excellency's despatch of 7th July, that Ibn Saood had ordered the Arab Sheikhs and tribes in Nejd to abstain from communication with Turkish officers and troops and to stop carrying their mails and supplies. Sudqi Pasha seems to have been on very friendly terms with Ibn Saood who visited him several times during his recent visit to Boreyda and brought his retainers and many Arab Sheikhs with him. The troops have no doubt suffered from want of money and though there was little or no fighting they must necessarily have endured great hardships.

(Sd.) F. E. CROW.

No. 12.

Copy forwarded to His Majesty's Resident and Consul-General, with the compliments of the undersigned.


BASRA ;

6th September 1906.


(Sd.) F. E. CROW,


His Britannic Majesty's Consul.











S 1935-2,000-3-06

No. 2140 of 1906

Confidential

BRITISH RESIDENCY AND CONSULATE-GENERAL:

Bushire, 5<sup>th</sup> September 1906.

To

THE POLITICAL AGENT,  
KUWAIT.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith for your information copy of a despatch addressed by H.B. No: 62 dated 31st August 1906. M's Consul at Busreh to H.B.M's Ambassador at Constantinople.

2. With reference to Mr. Crow's report as to the channels through which Ibn Saood and Meta'ab "bin Rashid" respectively receive their allowances, I would request the favour of being furnished with such further information as you may be able to obtain both on this point and as to the nature and amount of the payments made.

I have the honour to be


Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

P. Z. Cox

Major,

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.







No. 2181, dated Bushire, the 16th (received 24th) September 1905.

From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—SIR LOUIS W. DANE, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to forward, for the consideration of Government, a copy of the communication marginally quoted which I have received from the Political Agent at Koweit, on the subject of the aspirations of Bin Saood to enter into closer relations with the British Government.

2. In the same connection, I have the honour to refer to paragraph 2 of my letter No. 64 of 23rd February last to your address.

Subsequently when touring on the Arab Coast in May last I had an opportunity of meeting Sheikh Jasim bin Thani at his summer quarters at Lusail, and on that occasion he expressed himself to much the same effect on behalf of Bin Saood, saying that the latter was now strong enough to drive the Turks out of Nejd and Al Hassa and asking whether in the event of his coming down to the coast, the British Government could not see their way to give him the same measure of protection by sea as they gave to Sheikh Mubarak and other Arab Chiefs on the Coast, in pursuance of their traditional policy of preserving the maritime peace of the Gulf. He added that it would be a simple matter for Bin Saood to meet a British officer at the coast, if that course were considered desirable.

In reply, I told Sheikh Jasim that this was a question to which I could not give him any definite answer offhand and without instructions from the Government of India.

Just at that time the news of the death of Bin Rashid at the hands of his rival reached the coast and the situation seemed so kaleidoscopic that I delayed making any report to Government until matters had crystallised somewhat.

I have now received from Captain Knox a communication from Sheikh Mubarak to much the same effect as the foregoing. We have thus been approached from three directions and I think there can be no doubt that these representations may be held to have been inspired by Bin Saood personally.

3. Bin Rashid's death at the hands of his rival had an important influence on the situation, and as the Government of India have been informed, the three cornered peace of which the possibility was indicated in paragraph 2 of my letter No. 620 of 18th March has lately taken shape.

Whether it will endure on its own merits or whether the Turks will at once set themselves to undo it, it is impossible to prophesy, but seeing that the present Bin Rashid is a mere youth of 18, it is hardly likely that he will be able to make any serious stand against Bin Saood for some time to come. The juncture is consequently a convenient one for an examination and review of the political situation in Central Arabia and of our attitude towards Bin Saood and I venture to hope that Government will take advantage of it for that purpose.

4. While I believe I am right in thinking that His Majesty's Government regard with no favour the idea of the Turks establishing themselves in Nejd,\* I am at the same time aware that it has been a recognised principle of their policy not to allow themselves to become involved in the tempestuous politics of Central Arabia. Nevertheless it must be conceded that we have principles and interests to consider other than the pursuit of the purely negative doctrine of aloofness above mentioned, and I cannot see that these are in any way served by our carrying that doctrine to an extreme point and by our treating the predominant Arab element in Nejd with an active neglect which not only places us in an

\* (1) Foreign Department telegram No. 1748-E.A., dated 9th May 1904.

(2) Foreign Department letter No. 3397-E.B., dated 6th October 1904.



unnecessarily unfavourable position for safeguarding the other interests referred to but which, persevered in, may be mistaken for hostility on our part and may engender a reciprocation of that sentiment on the part of the Wahabi Chief.

5. Thus it will be remembered that Bin Saood formally appealed to us for protection in a letter to me, dated 16th May 1904, but no reply on behalf of Government to that communication was ever authorised, and at the present time no practical *modus vivendi* between the Arab and ourselves can be said to exist.

The inconvenience of this became apparent in connection with the intention attributed to Bin Saood of visiting Oman, which has created so much apprehension in the minds of the Pirate Coast Chiefs during the past year. Had they known that any sort of friendly understanding existed between the Residency or Government and Bin Saood, both the Sultan of Muscat and the Trucial Chiefs would have been fortified with the consequent knowledge that any attempt on the part of the Wahabi to make a descent upon Oman would involve a preliminary rupture with us. In the absence of any such entente all we could do was to get Sheikh Mubarak to give him a hint that any such action on his part would be regarded with disfavour by us. It is true that it appeared afterwards that His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople had expressed the opinion

*Vide correspondence received with Foreign Department endorsement No. 2020-E.B., dated 17th May 1905.*

way open to us. As a matter of fact

*Resident to Foreign Department No. 773, dated 5th April 1906.*

that we should deal with Bin Saood direct, but meanwhile it had become necessary to take action locally in the most expeditious this course met with a very courteous response from Bin Saood as reported to Government at the time.

6. Another matter in regard to which we lose by not being on any sort of terms with the Wahabi is the question of piracy in the northern part of the Gulf. There is good reason to suppose that, had we friendly relations with him, Bin Saood would be able to give us considerable assistance in running down notoriety like the outlaw Ahmed bin Salman, who yearly commits more or less serious depredations during the pearling season.


7. At the present epoch, as before mentioned, peace reigns in the land, and if we have any intention of establishing some measure of friendly intercourse with the Ruler of Nejd, the present seems to be the time for us to do so. If on the other hand we persevere in our policy of ignoring him altogether and leaving his appeals unanswered and if we allow the Turks to revive the strife in Central Arabia, which theoretically they have now no excuse for doing, it will be small matter for wonder if we make him our bitter enemy for the future.

I hesitate to make premature suggestions as to the terms which might figure in any agreement made, as I am aware that the problem is a delicate one and requires examination by a lens of longer focus than I can command, but I think I may say without temerity that I should welcome any degree of friendly understanding which would facilitate my dealings with the Trucial Chiefs and which would render it possible and unobjectionable for our officers to make occasional tours in the country and thereby to acquire accurate information regarding the topography, tribes, and tribal politics of the interior, in respect of which our present store of knowledge is very meagre.

In these latter connections, I solicit reference to the following items of previous correspondence:—

- (i) The latter part of letter No. 69, dated 26th March 1904, from the Government of India to the Secretary of State.
- (ii) Despatch from Sir Nicolas O'Connor to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, No. 189, dated 20th March 1906, in which His Excellency advocated the arrangement of a meeting between Bin Saood and a British representative on one of our Government ships at some convenient point on the Coast. If this could





3

take place, we should at all events know first hand what were the Arab's ambitions and what undertakings he was prepared to give in regard to matters which concerned us.

In any case, I trust that I may be placed in a position to give an authoritative reply to the enquiries of Sheikh Jasim and Sheikh Mubarak, for the information of their ally.

No. 313, dated Koweit, the 28th August 1906.

From—CAPTAIN S. G. KNOX, I.A., Political Agent,

To—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.


I have the honour to inform you that, at an interview that I had to-day with Sheikh Mubarak, he referred to the letters that Abdur Rahman bin Feysul bin Saood wrote in the year before last to your address and to the letter that reached me shortly after my arrival at Koweit, and seemed anxious again to persuade me that it would be to the advantage of the English to take Bin Saood under protection.


2. One of the arguments he used was that, with Nejd in security and Bin Saood under British protection, a caravan would start daily from Koweit for the interior and all its loads would be of Indian merchandise. He also said that Nejd contained with the tribes upward of three millions of men.

3. It is clear that Bin Saood and probably Mubarak himself are uneasy about the late activity of the Turks in El Kasim. Sheikh Mubarak declares now that the Turkish soldiers in Nejd are still 3,000 men.

4. In reply, I said to Sheikh Mubarak that he might rest assured that I would report this conversation to you.







No: 2182 of 1906.

202

CONFIDENTIAL

British Residency and Consulate-General,

(158)

Bushire, 16 September 1906.

Copy forwarded to the Political Agent, Kuwait, for information, with reference to his letter No:313 dated 28th August 1906.


By Order,

*J. Birdwood*

Lieutenant,

Special Assistant to the Political Resident  
in the Persian Gulf.

Letter No: 2181 dated 16 September 1906, from Major P.Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.







203  
168  
Demi-official, dated Bushire, the 16th (received 24th) September 1905.

From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,


To—SIR LOUIS W. DANE, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India  
in the Foreign Department, Simla.


I have addressed you officially by this mail on the subject of our relations with Bin Saood, and the situation in Nejd. Would it not be possible, now that peace reigns for the time being, and Bin Saood has no active rival left in the field, to make more of the "Status quo" argument as between ourselves and the Turks, in favour of an independent Nejd? If we allow the Porte to go on pushing troops into Nejd with the intention of crushing Bin Saood and gradually advancing their outposts southwards, we shall surely regret it. I do not see how the Wahabi can go on opposing the Turks indefinitely, for where is he to get the money required for the struggle; and unless we can devise some check on Turkish aggression now, it will be all the more difficult to apply a remedy later on. Diplomatic means are likely to be more efficacious in preventing their ingress than ejecting them once they have got a footing.

The cessation of strife among the Arabs themselves and the existence of this triple alliance, which Sheikh Mubarak intimates, seems to give us an excellent opening for telling the Turks that if they cannot let well alone and leave Nejd to its hereditary chiefs, we shall be obliged to take such measures in the interests of peace as our commercial stake on the Arab littoral and the effective suppression of piracy may seem to require. They themselves are impotent to do anything serious towards the maintenance of order and good government, and by continuing complacently to put up with their interference and aggression, we shall simply allow them to create for themselves prescriptive rights of occupation at one place after another, as we have done in the case of Al Bidaa, Umm Kasr and Bubian.



I am doubtful whether any agreement with Bin Saood, except as to matters which particularly concern us, such as the preservation of the maritime truce and friendly treatment of chiefs or principalities in treaty relation with us, would be expedient, as it might deprive the Wahabi of the power, if he should prove to have it, of expelling the Turks from Nejd and Hassa, but I hope the Government of India will feel able to ask His Majesty's Government to take some steps to put the Nejd question on a more satisfactory basis.



G. C. Press, Simla.—No. C804 F, D.—10-10-06—10—B.B.C.











Confidential  
British Residency & Consulate-  
General,  
Basrah, 26 September 1906.



Dear Captain Knox

Please see your Confidential  
D/O letter dated 14th September. The alter-  
ation made by you is correct.


The first entry in the list of communi-  
cations referred to will now read "Resident  
to Foreign No: 1942 of 19th August 1906".

yours sincerely  
H. Bindewood

S. G. Knox, I.A.,  
Mical Agent, Koweit.








*Confidential*

Koweit 206 (171)  
Persian Gulf.




My dear Major,

Your confidential D.O. of date  
Sept 10th 1906.

I cannot think that there is  
anything in the story of a general  
migration of Koweit to Sabiya.  
The name is all right & it would  
be slightly more probable than  
a migration to Subaihiya.


Subaihiya is nothing but a  
group of wells to the west of  
the Burgan hills where there is  
good camel grazing. It is about  
35 miles south & slightly west  
of Koweit & about 15 from the



nearest sea coast which would be  
the Adān villages of Funtass,  
Fauaitis, Abos Alalaifa &  
Shiaiba. Koweit could not  
live there for a week.

Salrija is in the bay, the  
opposite horn to Ras Ajiza.  
From my house you look to it  
almost due north. It is on the  
south end of the Khor Bulrija  
& boats can only approach at  
high tide over a long mud flat.  
It would be a perfectly hopeless  
place for the Koweit-pearl boats  
or for the steamer's cargo boats





much more so for the big Koweit<sup>207</sup>  
trading biggylows. There is a <sup>(172)</sup>  
small date garden of young trees  
& a scanty brackish water supply.  
Sheikh Moobarak may possibly be  
thinking of making a small  
settlement there & of cultivating  
the coast line between Chum Kam  
& Sabija which might repay his  
pains but it seems to me quite  
preposterous to imagine that he  
could dream of moving Koweit  
there. His subjects would revolt  
for there has been quite a lot  
of money sunk in Koweit in  
building & in wharfs, shops &c.  
It is possible that Sheikh  
Moobarak who claims Sabija








as undoubtedly his own, may have been trying to get Turkish recognition of his property in the place & wishes to mark his ownership in the way I have indicated.



It is also a smuggling depôt on a small scale for arms destined for Turkish Arabia & there may be some idea of improving its capabilities in this respect, so that the trade may be carried on far from my prying eyes. These are merely conjectures but far more likely to happen than what is suggested in Mac Douall's report.



Yours sincerely  
J. M. W.












Journal  
Sept 98  
certainly fight before  
submitting to the Turkish  
demands & that the  
people of Hejd would  
fight too. This is probably  
true so long as their side  
is winning but Abdul  
Aziz bin Saud has many  
enemies who would of  
course turn against him  
without hesitation at

the f  
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





(175A)

I am treating Bunder  
Shuwaikh as a mere  
matter of routine & of  
no particular urgency  
Yours sincerely  
J. Nicol.

P.S. I have kept no copy  
of this.









have addressed the people of Al-  
Kasim in the following terms.


"I don't wish to offer you advice  
& I admit that the soldiers we  
have here are not sufficient to  
take Al Kasim & that you are  
more numerous & as well armed  
as we are. But, if 500 of us are  
killed & we kill 200 of you, we  
can replace our 500 but where  
will you replace your 200. He'd  
is like a bit of string whereas  
the Turkish Govt. is like a bit  
of elastic & the Turkish Govt.  
must have Al Kasim. Should  
it not be as well for you to




put up with the light burden<sup>241</sup>  
it is now sought to impose<sup>(17)</sup>  
on you, rather than go through  
the process I have described?


From the way this story was  
told & came into the conversation,  
I do not think that it was  
made up for my benefit. I


Yours sincerely  
S. J. K. S.


























Confidential.

215

No. 2344, dated Bushire, the 6th (received 15th) October 1906.

From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—SIR LOUIS W. DANE, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

In continuation of the communications marginally noted, I have the honour

Letter No. 2181, dated 16th September 1906, from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

Telegram No. 378, dated 2nd October 1906, from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

\* Dated 18th and 26th September 1906.

to forward, for the information of Government of India, extracts from news-letters\* since received from Captain S. G. Knox, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit, regarding the outlook in Nejd.

*Extract from a news letter, dated 18th September 1906, from Captain S. G. Knox, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit, to Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.*

I write to let you know that Mubarak was again talking about Nejd and repeating how anxious Bin Saood was for protection.

He assured me that, whether helped by us or not, Bin Saood would certainly fight before submitting to the Turkish demands and that the people of Nejd would fight too. This is probably true as long as their side is winning but Abdul Aziz bin Saood has many enemies who would of course turn against him without hesitation at the first reverse.

*Extract from a news-letter, dated 26th September 1906, from Captain S. G. Knox, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit, to Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.*


The following news has reached me with reference to the situation in Nejd and seems to me to have its own significance.

The Turkish authorities are said to have addressed a letter to Meta'ab bin Rashid enquiring why he made peace with Abdul Aziz bin Saood and informing him that he had no authority to do so.

The Fariq, who passed through Koweit the other day, is said to have addressed the people of El Kassim in the following terms:—

"I do not wish to offer you advice and I admit that the soldiers we have here are not sufficient to take El Kassim and that you are more numerous and as well armed as we are. But, if 500 of us are killed and we kill 200 of you, we can replace our 500, but whence will you replace your 200? Nejd is a bit of string whereas the Turkish Government is like a bit of elastic and the Turkish Government must have El Kassim. Would it not be as well for you to put up with the light burden it is now sought to impose on you, rather than go through the process I have described?"

From the way this story was told and came into the conversation, I do not think that it was made up for my benefit.







Telegram No S100 *8-10-06*  
from Government of India to Resident

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(182)

P. It is suggested that the frequent visits recently paid by the Shaikh of Koweit to Shaikh Khazal together with the reconciliation arrived at between Bin Saood and Bin Rashid indicate the possibility that these individuals are contemplating the formation of a compact with the object of achieving independence from the domination of the Porte or any other <sup>Foreign</sup> power. Please state by telegram if you can consider that any such measure is <sup>possibly</sup> contemplated by them.


Telegram No 396 *10 Oct. 06*  
Resident to Foreign & Foreign with Viceroy.


53  
7-10


30

P. With reference to your telegram of 8th October. The contingency alluded to is not adumbrated in any recent reports from Koweit or Mahommerah. On the other hand recent changes in the political situation in Central Arabia already communicated to Government give reasonable grounds for the supposition that the Arabs of Nejd have been driven to desperation by the Porte's <sup>persistent interference and</sup> oppression may be disposed to combine in order to free themselves from the burden, and the Shaikh of Maomerrah may be interested as adviser and friend of Mubarak. I think they all realise however that they could not <sup>permanently</sup> succeed unassisted even as an Arab confederacy and must recognise the indispensability of protective support from a Christian power preferably ourselves, if we are prepared to give it in time and effectively.















Memorandum of information obtained by Mr. Gaskin  
~~on the 1st of October 1914 from the Amir of the State of Kuwait~~  
~~concerning the Turkish occupation of the State of Kuwait~~  
~~and the Amir of the State of Kuwait~~


With reference to the Turkish occupation, he informed  
me that there were only about 50 Turkish soldiers under  
a Kulaghazy at Borsida and a similar detachment at  
'Anaza, and the main body, consisting of over a thousand  
Infantry, a few Cavalry with 4 heavy field guns and 5 or  
6 lighter pieces, stationed at Shaihiya, a village about  
5 or 6 hours ride N.N.W of Borsida, under the command of  
Sani Pasha.

The Turks are there on sufferance, and do not inter-  
fere in any way with the local affairs, and confine  
themselves to their quarters, only leaving them when  
going to purchase food or going to the Mosque for  
prayers.


The troops are rationed by their own Government.  
The Amir does not provide them with anything. They are  
wretchedly off. Many of the officers and men are con-  
tinually deserting. If no fresh troops are sent to  
relieve the present garrison before long no soldiers will  
be left in Kassia through the wastage by disease and  
desertions.


As regards the young Amir, he stated that the people  
of Jabal Summar are very hopeful of him, and he has  
gained their affection through his straightforwardness,  
generosity, and the habit of carrying out no undertaking  
without consulting all the elders of the Al-Rashid clan  
and listening to the best advice. He has remitted the  
tribal taxes for the current year, and re-instituted the  
payment of annual allowances to the various tribal  
chiefs, retainers, and charities on the same scale as that  
paid

































S 1918-5,000-3-06





Agung asking for them back,  
the Turkish Customs refused  
to release them without  
payment of duty on the  
ground that their proper  
destination, ~~was~~ Koweit,  
being Turkish territory,  
they were clearly liable  
for duty. This is the  
class of incident that  
makes Sh. Mubarak  
so dissatisfied with the  
amount of assistance  
we give him. I do  
not want you to broach  
the subject in Koweit, <sup>but</sup> please  
let me know, if any  
details reach you from  
the mail etc or other  
source, what the precise  
facts are.


JMS.

12-9  
10/10.









( Copy )

Received on the 10th September 1906 with Political Secretary's letter No. 34, dated 24th August 1906.

Enclosure in Foreign Office covering letter of August 8, 1906.

Sir N.O'Conor to Sir E.Grey.

No. 511. Therapia,  
July 25th 1906.


Sir,


With reference to my despatch No. 490 of the 18th instant, I have the honour to report that I received on the 17th ultimo a telegram from His Majesty's Consul at Basra informing me that two negroes who possess information about the Maaghil affair had been handed over to the Turkish authorities by the Sheikh of Mohammera, but that he had not surrendered the persons who were alleged by the Turks to be implicated in the outrage although they had been arrested.

I transmit herewith copy of a despatch from

Mr.








226  
1926  
Mr. Crow confirming the information contained in his telegram. It would appear from the examination of the two surrendered negroes made by His Majesty's Consul at Mohammera that they have received orders from the Sheikh to deny that any Maadan Arabs were implicated in the outrage; and Mr. Crow believes that both the Sheikh of Mohammerah and his deputy Mirza Hamza have special reasons for wishing to screen the three Mandan Arabs who have known to have taken refuge on Persian territory and are charged by the Turkish authorities with direct complicity in the attack on Messrs Lynch's depôt and the murder of Mr. Glanville.


I have informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran that these Arabs have not been given up notwithstanding the orders to that effect sent from Tehran, and I have again pressed that instructions should be sent to Mohammerah for their immediate surrender.

In these circumstances, I do not think that the delay which has occurred in bringing the culprits to justice can be attributed wholly to negligence or indifference on the part of the Turkish authorities and I am instructing Mr. Crow by telegraph to proceed with









with the trial of those already arrested. I trust that  
in view of the stringent instructions sent to Majid  
Bey, the Acting Vali of Basra, by the Grand Vizier,  
the court martial will terminate its investigation  
without further delay.

I have, etc.,  
Sd. N.R.O'Connor.


Mr. Crew to Sir N.O'Connor.

British Consulate,  
Basra,  
June 28th 1906.


Sir,

With reference to my telegram No. 49 of  
June 16, I have the honour to report that a certain  
Mirjan and his brother alleged by the Sheikh of Moham-  
merah to be connected with the preparaters of the  
outrage at Maghil were handed over by him to the  
Turkish authorities on June 14th. The Sheikh of Moham-  
merah caused these men to be examined in Mr. McDonall's  
presence before leaving and Mr. McDonall sent me a  
copy of the notes taken by him of their examination.  
Their admission to which I referred in my despatch


No.


























230 186  
affair, and I am inclined to believe that our original information, as confirmed by the admission of Dahayesh and the statement of Mr. Mc Donnell's informant is substantially correct and that the Sheikh of Moham-merah is merely throwing dust in our eyes and screening the true offenders from justice.

I see no likelihood of catching any more culprits and it would now perhaps be as well to urge for the immediate trial of those already arrested, as suggested in the last paragraph of Your Excellency's telegram of May 9th last.


I have, etc.,

Sd. F.E.Crow.











232 (198)  
Turkish interference and willingly accept a subordinate position under the Turkish authorities, provided the Bin Saood dynasty was destroyed.


Thus the two factions, apart from the jealousy which has now become a second nature to them and the long blood feud account still unsettled, are hopelessly divided on what may be called their foreign policy.

4. Indications have not been wanting to show that the bond that unites the families of As-Saood and As-Subah is a loose one and that the Bedouins who live by plunder and lightly transfer their allegiance from one party to the other, as suits their own convenience, will almost certainly cause trouble between the two chiefs, unless they both show a restraint and moderation utterly foreign to Arab nature. It is, I venture to think, only Bin Saood's dread of Turkish encroachment and dominion that has so far kept him wary of offending Sheikh Mubarek.


5. Nothing serves to unite the interests of As-Subah and Bin-Rashid except a regard for the blessings of commerce and the maintenance of order. These considerations are not likely to weigh heavily with either side and least of all with Bin Rashid.

6. On the other hand, it would seem that Sheikhs Khazal and Mubarek have nothing whatever to quarrel about, while they are both large owners of date gardens, both draw a large income from the smuggling of arms and ammunition, both dislike the interference of the Belgian Customs, and both are anxious to maintain their independence, the one of Persian, and the other of Turkish, dominion. Each can help the other in these questions by advice, information mutual loans, combinations to raise the price of dates or rifles etc., These matters alone would be quite sufficient to account for frequent conferences and I think there is no reason to attribute to them the more far reaching designs sketched out in the Government of India telegram.

the









the impracticability of which the two Chiefs would be the first to realise.


I have the honour to be  
Sir,  
Your most obedient servant,

(sd). S.G. Knox. Major,  
Political Agent, Kuwait.











[Confidential.]

No. 2438, dated Bushire, the 14th (received 24th) October 1906.

From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—SIR LOUIS DANE, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter marginally noted, giving cover to a copy of Mr. Crow's despatch No. 62 of 31st August 1906 to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, on the subject of his interview with Sudgi Pasha, and referring also to the allowances paid by the Porte to the rivals in Nejd, I have the honour to forward, a copy of a report which I have received from the Political Agent, Koweit, in reply to an enquiry on the latter subject, for the information of the Government of India. A copy is also being forwarded to His Majesty's Consul, Basrah.

2. I take the opportunity to mention at the same time that I have since had an opportunity of discussing with Major Knox the subject of Sudgi Pasha's return from Nejd with 300 men *vid Koweit*, which was reported in article 1039 of this Office Diary for the week ending 2nd September; and have the honour to invite consideration to an aspect of the incident which inevitably suggests itself.

It will doubtless have been noticed that the Turkish Officer and his men were got out of the place by Sheikh Mubarak with all possible despatch and although Sheikh Mubarak and his subjects would probably be too proud to admit that their presence in Koweit caused any actual trepidation, it can hardly be doubted that the pulses of both one and the other were considerably quickened by the unwelcome visitation.

On this occasion their arrival was fortuitous and their intentions were doubtless innocuous, but as a precedent the incident is a somewhat inconvenient one, for it is possible to conceive that the experiment might be repeated with a larger force from Nejd or Baghdad, and that having arrived by this means a Turkish force might for the time being easily possess themselves of the town and of Sheikh Mubarak by a *coup de main* similar to that which the Bedouins effected in Maskat in 1895.

3. I venture to draw attention to the possibility, in case it might be considered desirable for us to give Sheikh Mubarak any advice on the subject for future guidance, or to suggest to the Porte that the course taken in this case seems to us open to objection and calculated to disturb unnecessarily the minds of the Koweit public, including British subjects.

If the Porte wants to put troops into Nejd, or get them out of Nejd, it is reasonable to argue that they should use Ojair for the purpose and not the territory of a neutral Chief.

No. 379, dated the 30th September 1906.

From—CAPTAIN S. G. KNOX, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit,

To—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.


I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 2140, dated 15th September 1906, on the subject of the allowances paid to Bin Saood and Bin Rashid by the Turkish Government.

2. In reply, I have the honour to inform you that Sheikh Mubarak informs me that the allowances are fixed as follows:—

For Abdur Rahman bin Feysul bin Saood, Turkish £ 90 per mensem.

For Meta'ab bin Rashid, 200 tigers rice per annum and Turkish £ 200 per mensem.





In addition to the above, Meta'ab's predecessors used to receive presents of arms and ammunition.

3. Sheikh Mubarak says that the allowances to Bin Rashid are paid through the Baghdad authorities, and that Yusuf Pasha bin Mandil, a Basrah merchant, draws the Saood allowances from the Basrah authorities and remits them by cheque to Abdulla Nafisi, a Koweit shopkeeper, who hands the money to Bin Saood's emissaries.



4. At the same time, enquiries I have made in another direction confirm His Britannic Majesty's Consul's statement that the allowances are paid through Sheikh Mubarak in the way indicated but, at the same time, my informant said that there was no regular channel and that the payments were made in whatever manner was most convenient.



5. While I was discussing this matter with Sheikh Mubarak, he suddenly turned to me and said "You have been asking me about Bin Rashid's and Bin Saood's pay, but you don't ask me any question about my pay?" I said "Surely, you don't draw any pay?" He replied "No, I do not, but the Turkish authorities at Basrah are for ever pressing me to accept it. Instead of that, I pay them and when they ask me for Turkish £200, I send them T. £600. I told them in reply to their insistence that the receipt of pay from the Turkish Government had ceased to be a source of honour and had, therefore, no longer any attractions for me and that, thanks be to God! I had plenty of money".

Copy of P.A.s letter  
sent to Basra under  
our endorsement  
2441 of 13.10.06


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





























Miss the Russian Ostroa.  
J. L. Co. are sending our  
small steamer to do  
the cabotage service from  
Katis to Basra. Have  
you heard anything  
about it? <sup>53</sup>/<sub>32</sub>  
Steamer got the over  
carried from cargo  
which was brought here in  
a B. & S. steamer and  
imposed by the Customs.  
They demand full duty on











effect a reconciliation with all his old enemies, and he can from the Sardar Arfa's palace communicate with people at Basrah and elsewhere without attracting attention. Many of the influential sheikhs such as Beni Rashid, Ghazban of the Beni Lam and others occasionally communicate with the Sardar Arfa.

As to the Sardar Arfa from conversations with him, especially when Colonel Meade was here about seven years ago, I am certain that he is fully convinced that he cannot stand alone and, being a Shi'ah, prefers Persian, if it can last, to Turkish suzerainty. His fear has always been that Persia will break up and then he must find protection





107  
protection against Turkey. He considered  
the interests of the whole country in the  
vicinity of the Shat-el Arab identical  
and British negotiations with Mubarek  
raised hopes that protection given to  
Koneyt & the South of the mouth of  
the Shat-el Arab would in time lead  
to protection being given to the country  
& the north thereof, inhabited by his  
Arabs.

I have the honour to be


Sir


Your most obedient servant


W. D. Russell

British Consul for Arabistan
















of Basrah, Abu Mendil, coming alongside, Sheikh Khazal signed to Bin Rushid's man to withdraw. Nothing as to the subject discussed is known.


Whatever the subject may have been I see no reason to alter my opinion as expressed in my letter under reference, Sheikh Khazal, even by those not friendly to him, is acknowledged to be the cleverest Sheikh who has ruled in these parts, and though he cultivates friendly relations with other powerful Sheikhs whenever possible, would not do anything to put himself in a false position with either the Persian or Turkish government.

I have the honor to be

Sir

your most obedient servant  
W. D. Macdonell





No: 2477 of 1906.

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Confidential

British Residency and Consulate-General,

Bushire, 2/4 October 1906.

From

Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E.,  
Political Resident in the  
Persian Gulf.

To

Sir Louis Dane, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.,  
Secretary to the Government of India  
in the Foreign Department,  
S I M L A.

Sir,

In continuation of my telegram No: 396 dated  
10th October 1906, I have the honour to forward copies of  
Koweit No: 1/C dated 13th October 1906.      communica-  
Mohammerah No: 53 dated 13th October      tions re-  
1906.      ceived from  
Mohammerah No: 54 dated 17th October      the Political  
1906.      Agent at Koweit, and His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah,  
on the subject of a possible Arab confederacy.

I have the honour to be

Sir,


Your most obedient servant,


ME


Major,

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.













244<sup>(212)</sup>  
the goods to Bombay.

5. The decision of His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople was no doubt arrived at after full consideration of the circumstances, and I am not prepared to question the wisdom of it.

On the other hand I think the Government of India will realise from the past history of our dealings with the Ruler of Koweit that this is just one of those incidents which Sheikh Mubarek most resents, and which inevitably impress him with the timidity of our support; and that as long as it is considered necessary that our policy in regard to him should follow such lines, the Government of India cannot expect Sheikh Mubarek to be whole-hearted or single-minded in his dealings with their local representatives.

There is no direct evidence to show that his recent hesitation to carry out his undertaking in regard to the use of the distinctive flag is due to this incident, but I may say this, that if I had known of it in time, I should have asked Captain Knox to postpone any communication to Mubarek with a view to the introduction of the new flag, until a more propitious opportunity presented itself.

I have the honour to be

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

*P. H. P.*

Major,


Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

*No 2479 of 1906*

*Bushire 24<sup>th</sup> October 1906*

*Copy forwarded to the Political Agent, Koweit, for information.*

*Amil  
7a*



No: 2480 of 1906.

Confidential.

British Residency and Consulate-General,

Bushire, 21<sup>st</sup> October 1906.

FROM

Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E.,  
Political Resident in the  
Persian Gulf.

To

Sir Louis Dane, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.,  
Secretary to the Government of India  
in the Foreign Department,  
S I M L A.

Sir,

In continuation of my letter No: 2438 dated 14th October 1906, I have the honour to forward a copy of a Baghdad No: 829 dated 8th October 1906. X communication received from the Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, on the subject of the "bin Saood" and "bin Rashid" representations.


I have the honour to be


Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

P. 2 Col Major,  
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.







No: 2482 of 1906.

Confidential

British Residency and Consulate-General,

Bushire, 2/10 October 1906.

From

Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E.,  
Political Resident in the  
Persian Gulf.

To

Major J. Ramsay, C.I.E.,  
Political Resident in Turkish Arabia,  
B A G H D A D.

Sir,

In acknowledging with thanks the receipt of your  
letter No: 829 dated 8th instant, I have the honour to  
forward a copy of a communication received from the Politi-  
No: 379 dated 30th September 1906. I cal Agent, Koweit,  
on the subject of the allowances paid by the Porte to Bin  
Saood and Bin Rashid.


I have the honour to be

Sir,


Your most obedient servant,


P. Z. Cox Major,


Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.






















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Telegram.

FROM , Foreign , Simla .

No: S.148 . , dated 15-11-06 .



(P). Nejd. The following telegram received from the Sect: of State for India dated 9th of November is repeated for guidance. Begins.



"Reference to the letter from Major Cox dated September the 16th which was forwarded with Secretary's letter No: 41 dated October the 11th, please see the telegrams from my predecessor dated February the 8th and December 30th 1904. The view is maintained by H.M.'s Govt: that their influence and interests should be confined to the coast. Without a previous sanction no steps should be taken to enter into relations with Nejd or to send agents into the interior." Ends.

The references quoted are enclosures to G. of I. letter No: 2918 E.A. dated September 7th 1904 para 4 , and telegram dated Jan: 23rd 1905 . (Foreign).


17  
15  
06

We had better ask Foreign to instruct us as to the terms of the reply which should be given to Shakle Mubarak Shakle Jassir. Please put up for mail. 19/11/06












succeeded in achieving his ends. 252 (220)

4. The resources of Najd are stated to have been strained to the utmost by the recent internecine wars, and Bin Sa'ud considers that the Oases of Hasa and Katif were always the most profitable possessions of his Wahhabi ancestors. He is anxious therefore to recover the two districts and he proposes that a secret understanding should be arranged between the British Government and himself under which he should be granted British protection from Turkish assaults at sea, in the event of his ever succeeding in driving the Turks, unaided, out of his ancestral dominions. In return for this protection the Amir is willing to bind himself to certain agreements (probably similar to those of the Trucial Chiefs) and to accept a Political Officer to reside at his Court. The details of this secret treaty he wishes to be settled or discussed at an interview which he is ready to give me either in person, or with his brother representing him, at some convenient rendezvous in the desert. Bin Sa'ud is determined to make an effort to obtain possession of Hasa and Katif, for without the additional revenue which he can derive from these tracts, he admits that he is unable to control the tribes who menace the highways of commerce and pilgrimage. He proposes therefore, in the first place, to apply to the Sultan for the Mutasarriflik (Governership) of the districts, and to throw off the Turkish yoke as soon as he considers the moment favourable, after establishing himself. If his application is refused, he will invade the districts as soon as he is ready, and having captured them, he will appeal openly to the British Government for protection. If he fails, he will never betray the secret understanding between himself and the Government! Possibly he will not make his attempt, even, for 4 or 5 years more.











253 (221)  
5. Such is the message, and Shaikh Jasin requests that the reply may be given to him only by word of mouth, when he will arrange to forward it on by trusted messenger.


6. I presume that the only answer possible is that while the British and Turkish Governments entertain friendly relations towards each other, it is impossible for the Government of India to enter into any such agreement as the Amir desires. I would like, however, to be permitted to add a warning to the Amir, that if he has never yet involved himself in any direct admission of subordination to the Sultan, as I understand he claims not to have done, he should be careful not to commit himself now unless he decides to abide by the consequences. It is generally believed by the Arabs in Bah-  
rain, that the Turkish Government, finding that they are unable to collect revenue in the two districts and that the people are favourable towards Bin Sa'ud, are themselves contemplating an invitation to the latter to assume the government in the Sultan's name.

7. With regard to Shaikh Jasin's own health, my Interpreter reports that he appeared considerably stronger than last spring, and that his eyes are so much improved that he is able to attend to all his correspondence himself.

He seemed however to be downcast in mind, which Mr Inam-ul Hak subsequently learnt was due to the fact that he had invested 80 lakhs of rupees in pearls this season at very high rates, and that he had found recently that he was likely to lose heavily in consequence of the subsequent fall in prices.


I have







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












Kasim.



This Cousin Nasra.

This Cousin's Affairs.

Nov 10. 1906.

..... From information received at Basra. Kasim has the people of Kasim asked Sami Pasha to help and bat- tle only and send the rest away. Sami Pasha is reported to have said that he must have four, whereupon the matter was referred by both sides to Tonipke. The Sultan then instructed the Commander of the 1st Army Corps at Bagdad to withdraw all troops from Kasim except two battalions, and in a year's time to reduce the force to one battalion. Orders were sent about a month ago to Sami Pasha to this effect. He said that there are nine battalions belonging to the 1st Army Corps in Kasim, but none are up to full strength. The effect of each battalion is reckoned as.



as about 200 men. It is said the  
troops are preparing to evacuate  
Kasim and that the troops sent  
from Medina will also be withdrawn.


I am also informed that  
Izzet Pasha received a letter from  
Sheikh Dumbareh a few days ago  
forwarding £200 - as the Sheikh  
had heard the barracks at Basra  
were still unfinished. The letter  
was couched in obsequious terms  
and Izzet Pasha was requested to  
inform the higher authorities  
of the Sheikh's further donation.

I have re.  
J. J. J.


No. 15.  
Forwarded to His Resident at  
Bushra with the compliments  
of the undersigned.  
Basra.  
Nov. 10. 1906.


J. J. J.  
His Cousin.


























My dear Knox.


As you may  
suppose I found your No  
451 received yesterday <sup>very interesting</sup>

I very much fear that the  
present Cabinet will have  
nothing whatever to do with  
the affairs of Central Arabia,  
and we shall be lucky if  
they allow us to avoid the  
suggestion of personal discus-  
sion or neglect. by giving  
some answer at any rate,  
even though an unfavourable  
one. You can do no more than  
you have, namely assure  
Sh. Mubarak that his represen-  
tations are forwarded from here  
to the proper quarter. You see











































(Sd) J. Ramsay, Major.








267 235  
Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Diary to Government of India for week ending August 6, 1906

59. I have had an interesting conversation with M. Cugnin, a French engineer, who has been employed to improve irrigation on the Euphrates. He was kind enough to explain his project and show me his plans. The gist of the conversation is given in a Memorandum written by me for the Board of Trade, of which a copy is being sent to the Government of India. I have telegraphed to London an outline of the proposal to buy pumps.

60. Last Sunday being the anniversary of the birthday of the Shah, the "Comet" was dressed, and I went in full uniform to pay the usual call on the Persian Consul-General. It has been the custom to pay these honours on a Sunday, otherwise I should have declined to do so. The other European nations keep their fête-days on a Sunday when it happens to fall on that date.

61. I have received a post copy of a telegram from the Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 12th July, about a Confidential Report submitted by me. I have not yet received the original, and nothing is known of it at the telegraph








268 (236)


telegraph office here.

62. One of the leading merchants of Bassorah informs me that the Hamburg-American Line has begun to take cargo for Hamburg and Antwerp at 17s. 6d. a ton, being a reduction of 10s. a ton on the rates recently charged by English lines. The steamers of the Hamburg-American Line do not call at any English port. The merchant who gave me this information said that he thought that this was on account of some understanding with the English lines that the latter should not run to Continental ports. If there is any mutual understanding of this sort, it is difficult to see what need there was for such an immediate and large reduction of freight. It looks rather like an attempt to induce cargo for transshipment to leave London, e.g., the liquorice root, which goes in large quantities to America. This suggestion is not based on any expert opinion (see paragraph 22).

63. As connected with the above paragraph, it may be interesting to note that last night I was talking to the Manager of the Turkish river steamers and to the captain of one of Lynch's steamers. They both said that there had lately been loud complaints of the damage done to cargo

by





by the British India. I believe that an influential member of the Company is at Bussorah making inquiries.


64. I hear that it is proposed to send a regiment of Redifs to a place called Ahss. Mr. Gaskin says that this is a common name for El Hassa.

65. The recent trouble among the Arabs on the Tigris has been caused by competition between two Sheikhs - Seyhud and Gazban - for a plot of land known as Kuwait. The Vali is reported to have given the land to a nominee of Gazban's, who is said to have paid about £ T. 7,000 or £ T. 8,000 in bribes. The result has been that Seyhud attacked the El Azarij, who are partisans of Gazban's, and now Gazban and Seyhud are mobilizing their forces for a general engagement (see paragraph 41).

66. Talib Bay, the aide-de-camp of the Sultan, has brought a decoration for Muti'b, the son and successor of Abdul Aziz-bin-Rasid. A relative of Muti'b's has come to take Talib Bay to Kasim (see paragraph 56).

Baghdad, August 6, 1906.







[Confidential.]

No. 2799, dated Bushire, the 2nd (received 12th) December 1906.

From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,  
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of my two letters marginally noted by last mail, in connection with Nejd affairs, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a further communication which I have since received from the Political Agent, Koweit, No. 451, dated 20th November 1906. Koweit, reporting the details of a conversation which he has had with Sheikh Mubarak.

The latter's remarks in behalf of Bin Saood's cause, as reported in paragraph 5 of Captain Knox's letter, are a repetition of his former representations, but his subsequent observations regarding the Baghdad Railway question, are of much interest as evidence of the astute concern which he takes in the political situation, and, at the same time, seem to me to bear out the view which I have all along maintained that, in spite of the coquetry with the Turks in which the force of circumstance obliges him periodically to indulge, Sheikh Mubarak has at bottom a genuine conviction that his salvation lies in close adherence to the Christian Power, at present Great Britain, which occupies a predominant position in the northern portion of the Gulf.

No. 451, dated the 20th November 1906.

From—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit,  
To—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have the honour to inform you that I have just returned this morning from a visit to Sheikh Mubarak at which he gave me the following news from Nejd.

2. He said that he had received letters from Bin Saood and from Bin Rashid, and that the former had told him that the Mutessarif with 1,200 men (Syrian troops) and 12 guns had left for Medina on the 15th Ramzan=3rd instant, and that on the first day of Shawal=19th instant, the Amir-ul-Alai (Commandant) with 1,100 Iraq men and 3 guns would return to Iraq.

3. Bin Saood also said that the Turkish authorities were very anxious to leave 200 men in El Kasim, of whom 100 men should remain in Boraida and 100 in Anaiza. To this, however, he and the headmen of El Kasim refused to consent, and eventually it was agreed that small detachments only should remain, viz., 25 men in Boraida and 15 in Anaiza.

4. Bin Saood also said that he holds a paper signed by 80 Turkish Officers to say that they have found Bin Saood a loyal servant of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, who has helped them to all they needed as far as possible; that Nejd is a poor country with an abominable climate, bad water and no supplies which can support Turkish troops.

5. Sheikh Mubarak ended this lengthy recital with comments on the affairs of Al Hassa which he said were in a very bad way, and he suggested that it would be an excellent thing if Bin Saood were to take Al Hassa and Katif, his ancestral property, and that he would then apply for the official protection of His Majesty's Government.

6. To this, I replied that I could make on this proposal no comment whatever, but that, as the Sheikh probably was perfectly well aware, all communications that he made to me were promptly passed on to you for transmission to higher authority who would send such instructions as they thought fit and that it was idle for me to speculate as to what views such authority would take.





7. The Sheikh then mentioned that a large number of people at Kerhala had applied to His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad for protection, and that the Muntafik country round Amara between the two Vilayets of Baghdad and Basrah was full of revolt, and that the railway would never reach the sea nor be prosperous unless it was in British control from Baghdad to the sea, and that the Sultan could draw the profit of it. He said that the Germans had been playing with the Porte, and remarked that it was England and her warships that had saved Constantinople at the close of the last Russo-Turkish War.


8. The Sheikh told me that he had no exact information as to the Turkish casualties, in Al Hassa, but that the Ajman declared that they had destroyed two troops (طابورين) and taken away their arms, and that more than half the Al Hassa garrison had been killed. He said that undoubtedly Fahad bin Hithlain, the Ajman Chief, now in Koweit, had captured a gun and had brought in two mules and many donkeys for sale in Koweit and would send in more.


9. Fahad bin Hithlain came to see me on the 19th instant, and with him an old and influential Sheikh of the Ajman, named Salim bin Muhammad of the Al Hadi Section. The Chief is a fine handsome young man of about 30 years of age. He looked lazy and goodnatured and talked but little, but he gave one the impression that he would be a leader of men, fierce and vindictive, if he were roused to action.


10. These two both exaggerated Sheikh Mubarak's account of their victory and said that the El Hassa townsmen with the soldiers had now tasted their vengeance and were ready to agree to any terms. They had offered to write off all claims for blood-shed and to pay up all arrears of allowances due to the Ajman Sheikhs, and especially sued that they might redeem the gun (offering for it T.£2,000) and to pay double prices for all arms and mules. Fahad refused to sell the gun, saying that he would send it either to Mubarak or to Bin Saood. The two Chiefs offered me a warm welcome if I came into their country, which begins about three days south of Koweit.

11. The Turkish withdrawal from Nejd, coupled with the news from Al Hassa, appears to have had an effect, very unfortunate for them, on public opinion in these parts and one might hazard the assertion that Sheikh Mubarak knows more than he told me about possible complications in Al Hassa and the Muntafik country.












Passports of telegram this morning.  
Bassa to this thing's affairs  
Lough. No 24. Dec. 7. 1906.



A letter dated Nov 12 has been received  
from Hassa. According to the account  
given it appears that Arab tribes  
attacked the town on Oct. 22. and  
engaged the Turkish troops. The  
Turkish loss was considerable in  
men, mules and rifles and Arabs  
captured a cannon. A village  
called Shiqag, which belongs to  
the British Department, was  
plundered and burnt. Money  
was paid to the tribes to retire,  
the captured cannon returned,  
and peace restored.

No 16. Forwarded to the British Resident  
Basra with the compliments  
7.















H.B.M.'s Consul Basra to H.B.M.'s Charge d'Affaires Constantinople No.82, Dec.8 1906.

Sir,


With reference to my tel.84 of Dec.7, I have received the following report regarding the recent troubles in El Hassa.

A letter from Hassa dated Oct.29 1322 ( Nov.12 1906 ), received here by Mahmoud Bey Tabour Agassi of Hassa, states that twenty days ago the town of Hassa was surrounded day and night by Arabs of the El Ajman and other Bedouin tribes in consequence of the murder of Abdullah Bin Jaber a merchant of Hassa . The townsmen fled , 8000 men of Hassa, 600 infantry and 200 mounted men united and attacked the tribes. During the engagement which followed 2 lieutenants and 72 infantry were killed and 57 men wounded on the Turkish side and 85 mules, 125 rifles and one gun were captured by the Arabs. A village named Shigezz, belonging to the Seniye Department, situated about two hours from Hassa was plundered and burnt by the tribes and many villagers were killed and wounded.


In the Hakamiye garden 4 soldiers were killed and 2 sergeants of the gendarmerie wounded and 16 rifles were captured. The inhabitants of other villages gave money and dates to the Arabs to leave them alone and so escape.




اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: [http://www.qdl.qa/arabica/archive/81055/vdc\\_100023587940.0x000067](http://www.qdl.qa/arabica/archive/81055/vdc_100023587940.0x000067)










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Extract from Political Diary of the Baghdad Residency  
for the week ending 10th December 1908.


(171). According to what is I believe the official account the Turkish troops are returning to Baghdad from Kasim. The unofficial account which has reached me is somewhat different. The story, as told to me, by a man who has fairly good sources of information, is as follows:- Ibn Sa'ud wrote from Riadh to the Ajman, Beni Khalid, Beni Hajir and Manasir tribes to turn the Turkish troops out of El Hassa. The Arabs summoned the Turkish troops and told them they must either fight for their existence or leave the country, as the Sultan's troops had no business in El Hassa, which did not belong to him. A fight took place in which 85 Turkish officers and soldiers were killed, and 200 wounded. The troops were forced to give up their arms and ammunition, and to leave the country via Medina.


As regards Kassim the same informant tells me the following story:- Ibn Sa'ud wrote to the Mutair and Utaibu tribes to fight Sami Pasha or remove him and his troops from Kasim. The troops elected to go and (after giving up their arms and guns?) they went towards Medina. It is said that 1700 men recruited in Irak have been lost.


The same informant tells me that at present Ibn Sa'ud is on good terms both with Mut'ib and with Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit.






























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if the police and civil authorities failed to find them and hand them over for trial, all proceedings were inevitably blocked. I therefore asked his Excellency to take stringent measures for the arrest of the culprits so that the court-martial could do its work. I also remarked that I had received trustworthy information that the majority of the suspected persons were still on Ottoman territory.

I then described to His Excellency in some detail the attack on the British-Indian's house as witnessed by Europeans from the neighbouring roofs, and I laid some stress on the fact that the attack occurred in the European quarter, near the Consulate, and that I myself had been roused by the shooting and alarm. I pointed out that the patrol, some soldiers, and the marine guard at the arsenal were all present, and neither rendered assistance nor attempted to catch the thieves; that one of the offenders had been subsequently recognized by Joseph Pollock, that he was a sapper in the Imperial army, and that, in spite of my representations, his immediate superior, a captain in the artillery, continued to prevent his arrest. I pressed for his immediate imprisonment. His Excellency replied that he had cognizance of the matter, and would give it his attention. I have since learnt that the man has been given up and imprisoned.

I then suggested that I should give his Excellency a written statement of our complaints, to enable him to examine and settle them, and I again impressed upon him the necessity of remedying the inefficiency of the police, as it was hopeless to expect the local authorities to do their duty as long as the police systematically evaded orders and connived at the escape of criminals. His Excellency promised to consider the question and to attend to our requirements.

I then touched on the disturbances at Amara, and urged on his Excellency the necessity of protecting our steamers from interference on the river. I remarked that Gadban fired on them with the object of eliciting our interference, and in order to put pressure on the Ottoman Government. The Vali replied that, if that were the case, he had not gained much, as the land in dispute had been given neither to Gadban nor to Seyhood, but to an independent party.

According to my information, this statement is false, as the Vali's dealings with Gadban are notorious, and the lessee of Kumeid is stated to be a mere nominee of Gadban's, who paid Medjid Bey over 4,000 liras to keep the land out of Seyhood's hands. I said, however, that I was glad to hear he had found a satisfactory conclusion, and I hoped that it would last; but as the attack on the "Khalifeh" occurred on Gadban's land he was primarily responsible for it, and ought to be punished, and I asked His Excellency whether he proposed to take any steps to call him to account for it. The Vali replied that it was not easy to fix the blame or to find the actual aggressors. I said I did not see the necessity of that, but I thought, on public grounds alone, that the Arab Chief, in whose district the attack occurred, should be held personally responsible. Was the Ottoman Government with its troops and its administrative resources unable to keep the Arabs in order, or to punish a man in Gadban's position? His Excellency replied that it could no doubt be done, but it was a wild country, and the Arabs a wild people. He seemed disinclined to move in the matter; and in view of my information regarding the line he had taken, I thought it useless to pursue the subject.

His Excellency stated that he thought it was a great mistake ever to have separated the Vilayets of Bagdad and Bussorah. I told him I could not agree with him. Bussorah was an important commercial centre, and its affairs could not be administered properly without a resident Vali. I said he ought to be a civilian with some knowledge of trade requirements, to which he agreed, and added that the local military authority ought to be directly subject to his orders.

I forwarded to the Vali yesterday three Memoranda, dealing with:—

- (a) The Magbil case;
- (b) The attack on the British-Indian's house; and
- (c) The theft of property still unrecovered from the premises of my dragoman's brother-in-law, of which 131 liras belonged to my dragoman, Naoum Abbo.

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The Vali returned my visit to-day, and in the course of conversation stated that exaggerated reports about the disturbances on the river had been sent to Constantinople. He said the Porte had telegraphed that the "Medjidie" was lost, trade interrupted, and sailing-vessels were being attacked and plundered on the river. I replied that grave fears had been entertained for the safety of the "Medjidie," as she left at a disturbed time, and no timely news of her arrival at Amara could be obtained, owing to the telegraph lines having been cut. Steps had, however, been taken in time to check the disorders, and she reached her destination safely. I said: "Sailing craft had undoubtedly been attacked." He replied: "Perhaps some time ago, but not recently." I said: "Not very long ago," and the result has been that the Nakhodas were scared and afraid to proceed, and had detained their ships at different points of the river. Some sixty to eighty with grain and liquorice had waited a long time at Amara. As long as merchants could not get grain from up-river, owing to the unrest, they were prevented from loading their ships and could not fulfil their contracts. Under these conditions, trade was certainly interrupted. Now, however, owing to the steps taken, and the assurances given, the evil had been removed and the situation had temporarily improved. Sailing-vessels were coming down freely with guards on boards. I said I hoped the improvement would continue, and the Vali laughed. He gave me no further assurance on the subject, but asked the date of the arrival and departure of the "Medjidie" this week. I think he is alive to the necessity of taking steps to preserve order. He has evidently received his instructions.

I have, &c.


(Signed) F. E. CROW.

P. S.—July 19, 1906.—On the 19th instant the Vali wrote me an urgent letter to the effect that the Grand Vizier, at the instance of the Embassy, was asking about an attack alleged to have been made on two English steamers. His Excellency asked me to inform him at once of the names of the steamers, and to state where, how, and by whom they had been attacked, in order that he might arrest and punish the aggressors. I wrote in reply to say that the British vessels attacked were the "Medjidie" and the "Khalifeh." That on the night of the 12th May the "Medjidie" was surrounded by 100 Arabs, and her progress impeded about 15 miles below Ezra's tomb. As for the "Khalifeh" as his Excellency was aware, and has had been stated in my letter No. 73 of the 16th June to the Vilayet, the attack on that vessel occurred on the 30th May near Nehr Ariz, that the author of these attacks was Gadban, Sheikh of the Beni-Lam, and that no further attacks on British vessels had been reported to me since.


The Vali leaves for Nasryeh on the 20th instant, to-morrow.


F. E. C.















[Confidential.]

No. 29, dated Bushire, the 4th (received 15th) January 1907.

From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,  
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 2799, dated 2nd December 1906, I have the honour to forward copies of the communications marginally noted regarding the exodus of Turkish troops from Kasim.

News-letter from Political Agent, Kuwait,  
dated 25th December 1906.  
Telegram from His Britannic Majesty's Consul,  
Basrah, dated 31st December 1906.

2. The Government of India have already learnt from the enclosures to my letter No. 3051, dated 16th December 1906, and the previous report alluded to therein, of the difficulties in which the Turkish garrison of Al Hassa recently found themselves; and the incidence of these simultaneous set-backs, added to the prevalent knowledge of their want of success in Yemen cannot fail both greatly to depreciate the prestige of the Porte in Central Arabia and to strengthen the confidence of Bin Saood, of which mention has frequently been made of late, in his ability to make a clean sweep of Turkish troops from his particular sphere.

Dated Camp Wara, the 25th December 1906.

From—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, I.A., Political Agent, Kuwait,  
To—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Some interesting news reached me yesterday by a lucky chance. I think I have already told you of one Turkish soldier who came into my camp. Yesterday we got another who still wears a few rags of uniform but had no rifle nor ammunition. This is his account of his adventures. He reached Safa wells with the other soldiers but a few hours out he fell ill, buried his rifle and lay down by it. He was picked up with his rifle by some townsmen who brought him along on their camels as far as Gara, the plateau on the far side of the Shaq about opposite Subaihiya. There they took his rifle, bound him and left him to die. A passing Bedouin unbound him, gave him food and drink and set him on his way again. He was eventually found by Jafir, one of my sowars and brought in. He is a native of Moosul and is accompanying my Camp into Kuwait.

About tea time in came Misfir, an Ajman Bedouin, whom I enlisted as sowar when I formed my camel escort and never saw again. He got leave to hunt for his Thalool and wandered up to Nejd where Bin Saood chose the old gentleman, a well known guide, to act as rafiq to the Turkish soldiers and sent him down to Kuwait paying him reals thirty-five for his services. He was 25 days on the road and started with them from Boraida. He reckons the number of Turkish soldiers who came at from 7—800. They had six guns with them, two large and four small. Their transport was about 2,000 camels. They got 700 camels from Anaiza and about 800 from Boraida and about 700 from Zulf. They were all the property of townsmen and were commandeered by Bin Saood's orders, but hire was paid in advance. Twelve reals per camel was paid for the journey which was cheap enough. I suppose it was all they could screw out of the Turks and the people were only too glad to see El Kasim quit of them. Misfir knows that only 8 soldiers were left in Anaiza and he thinks the same quantity in Boraida.

Sheikh Mubarak turned the soldiers off to their left and would not permit them to enter Kuwait nor even Jahra but sent Abdul Aziz bin Salim bin Badar with provisions out for them.

Misfir gave me also the following details about Nejd affairs. The Amir of Boraida is Khalid bin Abdulla Abul Khail, who is a cousin of Salehul Mobanna, the ex-Amir who, Misfir assures me, is not dead but still in prison under Bin Saood's orders. Misfir tells me that he has spoken with the man who supplies him with food and drink. Saleh's death was reported by me






some time ago. The term Abul Khail appears to be an alternative for Al Mohanna. I have never heard it before. The Amir of Anaiza is Abdul Aziz us Salaim. He was appointed by the townsmen of Anaiza while Khalid bin Abdulla of Boraida is a nominee of Bin Saood. It appears, according to Misfir, that no Turkish representative of standing has been left in either of the towns and that the soldiers are under the orders of the two Amirs.


Telegram, dated the 31st December 1906.

From—F. E. Crow, Esq., His Majesty's Consul, Basrah,  
To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

Please refer to my telegram No. 79. On December the 28th 900 more men arrived from Kassim, thus making out of the seven battalions a total of 1,050. They are in a miserable condition. Sami Pasha, I am informed, left for Medina and there remain in Kassim only 26 soldiers.

Addressed Constantinople. Repeated Bushire.









(Confidential.)

No. 157, dated Bushire, the 20th (received 29th) January 1907.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,  
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to refer to my letter No. 2438, dated 14th October 1906, in which I ventured to suggest certain inconvenient aspects of the inclination evinced by the Turks to make use of Koweit, without reference to Sheikh Mubarak, as a base or channel for the ingress and egress of their troops to and from Nejd.

2. In the same connection, I beg to attach extracts from recent news-letters from the Political Agents at Koweit and Bahrein, for the information of the Government of India.

Political Agent, Bahrein, to Resident, No. 545,  
dated 16th December 1906.

Political Agent, Koweit, to Resident, dated  
23rd December 1906.

In the particular case mentioned by Captain Prideaux, on receiving his letter I took steps forthwith to find out from Basrah what foundation there was for the report current at Bahrein and to ascertain the probable movements of the S.S. *John Scott* which had been chartered to convey the troops; and as she ended in proceeding direct to Katif, it was not necessary to trouble Government with a reference; but in regard to the general question involved, I share Captain Prideaux's opinion, and in view of the fact recently reported, that the Porte has issued instructions to the local officials at Basrah to treat Koweit and Bahrein as integral portions of the Ottoman Empire, I shall be glad to be favoured with the views of Government on the subject.

No. 545, dated the 16th December 1906.

From—CAPTAIN F. B. PRIDEAUX, I.A., Political Agent, Bahrein,  
To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have just heard that a Turkish transport is expected here in two or three days' time, and that it is proposed to land the troops here for conveyance in sailing boats to their destinations—Katif, Ojair and Doha, or perhaps only one or two of these places. In any case, it is believed that the steamer will not go to any of the mainland ports herself. I hear also that she will fire two guns on her arrival here, whether as a salute to the Sheikh or to let Katif know of her arrival, I cannot say.

This procedure (landing the troops) it seems to me is only justifiable when the port is a component part of the Turkish Empire, and would not be tolerated in any other circumstances except after special diplomatic correspondence and the obtaining of the Ruler's permission.

It is not likely that the Turks will formally apply to Sheikh Esa for sanction, nor will it be regular for him to accord it direct. It seems to me that the landing of a considerable body from a troopship is very different to booking small parties by the ordinary mail-steamer and allowing them to tranship here.

Dated the 23rd December 1906.

From—Major S. G. KNOX, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit,  
To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

A Turkish soldier or hanger on turned up yesterday at my camp. He is one of a large body that passed not very far from us and we have seen other stragglers. It appears that a body of about 1,000 is moving down from Nejd, and I hear that Sheikh Mubarak, who is in camp at Jehra, has sent men out to divert them in his direction and not to allow them to enter the town. My friend, who has come to my camp, tells me that the larger party of troops were



those who returned to Medina and that it is the smaller division who are returning to Baghdad. He says that the Baghdad force was originally much the larger, but that, while only 100 men were actually killed in battle, 2,000 died of disease and starvation. He himself, though he looks healthy and well fed, was in a pretty deplorable state of destitution. He has no boots or shoes and only one garment—a coarse brown overcoat very tattered. One leg was badly swollen and the other foot had double blisters. I operated and dressed his blisters and am giving him food and lodging until we leave, but two days' rest will probably set him up and fit him to get to Koweit.

